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Naked Land Transfers and American
Constitutional Development
Mark A. Graber

53 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (2000)

The constitutional prohibition on naked land transfers, laws
granting to B property that belonged to A, played a far greater role in
American constitutional development than is generally realized. The
Marshall and Taney Courts heard numerous cases in which government
officials were accused of expropriating private property, typically by
legislative oversightratherthan by deliberateintent. When resolving these
cases, antebellum justices relied heavily on "certaingreat principles of
justice"ratherthan on specific constitutionalprovisions. Supreme Court
majorities on several occasionsprobably exercised the judicialpower to
declare federal laws unconstitutional. More frequently, Marshall and
Taney Court decisions in naked land transfer cases imposed clear
constitutionallimits on federal power even if, in a technical sense, those
rules did not strike down a particularfederal measure. Such cases as
Polk's Lessee v. Wendal & AL, United States v. Percheman, and Pollard's
Lessee v. Hagan provide an unappreciatedlink between Calder v. Bull
and Lochner v. New York in the development of fundamental rights
jurisprudence,and an unappreciatedlink between Marbury v. Madison
and Dred Scott v. Sandford in the establishment of judicialreview.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Legislation "taking the property of worthy A and giving it to
the undeserving B" was "the paradigmatic constitutional taboo" during the nineteenth century.' Supreme Court opinions proclaimed, "[ilt
is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature
with SUCH powers" as the power to make "a law that takes property
from A. and gives it to B."' Leading constitutional treatises similarly

*
Much thanks to Mark Brandon, Barry Friedman, Howard Gillman, Larry Kramer,
Charles McCurdy, Scott Powe, Mark Tushnet, and Keith Whittington for comments on earlier
drafts of this Article. Even more thanks to the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C. for the yearlong fellowship that enabled me to do the research and writing of this Article. An early version
was presented at the 1999 meeting of the Law and Society Association.
1. Thomas C. Grey, The MalthusianConstitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 42-43 (1986); see
also John V. Orth, Taking From A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Processand the Case of the
Shifting Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENTARY 337, 341-44 (1997) (noting that previous to the
nineteenth century, permitting persons to be judges in their own cases was the standard
paradigm of what legislatures could not do).
2. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.); see also Davidson v. City of
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 102 (1878); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829). The
most recent Supreme Court assertion of this principle is in Eastern Enterprisesv. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498, 523 (1998). Early nineteenth-century state courts expressed similar sentiments. Justice
Smith Thompson while on the New York bench asserted, "it is repugnant to the first principles of
justice, and the equal and permanent security of rights, to take, by law, the property of one
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declared, "if the legislature should take the property of A., and give it
to B., ... the law would be clearly unconstitutional and void."'
Antebellum jurists confidently asserted this constitutional limitation
on both state and federal power even though the original Constitution
as amended in 1791 lacked explicit bans on all uncompensated state
government takings of private property and on compensated state
takings for no public purpose." Moreover, nineteenth-century justices
did not treat the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as the primary source for the ban on federal expropriation The prohibition on
these "naked" land transfers-the distribution of property "solely on
the ground that those favored have exercised raw political power to
obtain what they want"--was almost universally recognized as an unenumerated, or at least not specifically enumerated, constitutional
property right, valid against both state and feddral action.7 'Taking
from A and giving to B," historian John V. Orth documents, was used
as "the shorthand to describe what substantive due process was designed to prevent."8

individual, without his consent, and give it to another." Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 493
(N.Y. 1810) (Thompson, J.).
3.
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 276 (1971). For a similar contention
by a distinguished late twentieth-century commentator, see Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1724 (1984) (claiming that "[t]aking property from
A in order to benefit B is the core example" of a governmental action banned by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
4.
See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-48 (1833) (explaining that
neither the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor any other provision of the Bill of Rights
limits the power of state governments); accord Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 90-91
(1858).
5.
None of the federal cases discussed in this Article cite the Fifth Amendment. This
provision was cited by counsel in only one case. See Sampeyreac v. United States, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 222, 228-29 (1833) (argument of Mr. Prentiss). At least one justice implied that the
Takings Clause was superfluous, that no government could take property without compensation,
even if such actions were not explicitly banned by the relevant constitution. See West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 540 (1848) (Woodbury, J., dissenting) (asserting that
whether land "could be taken without compensation, where no provision exists like that in the
fifth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, or that in the Vermont
constitution.... is a more difficult question, and on which some have doubted').
6.
Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1689. Strictly speaking, the prohibition on naked land
transfers is not limited to a ban on land transfers that reflect naked preferences. Takings must
not only be for a public purpose, but also accompanied by adequate compensation.
7.
Ronald Dworkin persuasively maintains that the "distinction... between enumerated
and unenumerated rights is... [a] misunderstood semantic device," and that understanding the
meaning of all constitutional provisions requires interpretation." RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 76-81 (1996). I do not think
Dworkin would dispute that the text specifies some constitutional rules and principles more
clearly than others.
8.
Orth, supra note 1, at 339.
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This constitutional prohibition on naked land transfers played
a far greater role in American constitutional development than is generally realized. The Marshall and Taney Courts heard numerous
cases in which government officials were accused of granting to B
property that belonged to A. When resolving these cases, antebellum
justices relied heavily on "certain great principles of justice"9 rather
than on specific constitutional provisions. Supreme Court majorities
on several occasions probably exercised the judicial power to declare
federal laws unconstitutional." More frequently, Marshall and Taney
Court decisions in naked land transfer cases imposed clear constitutional limits on federal power even if, in a technical sense, those rules
did not strike down a particular federal measure. The justices consistently misread or ignored federal statutes, making absolutely clear
that the statute would have been declared unconstitutional if interpreted according to its obvious meaning. Such cases as Polk's Lessee v.
Wendal & Al," United States v. Percheman," and Pollard'sLessee v.
Hagan" provide an unappreciated link between Calder v. Bull" and
Lochner v. New York" in the development of fundamental rights jurisprudence, and an unappreciated link between Marbury v. Madison"
and Dred Scott v. Sandford7 in the establishment of judicial review.
Polk's Lessee, Percheman, Pollard's Lessee, and similar decisions cannot be explained or even recognized by an approach to judicial review based on the premise that when the justices "declare[ ] unconstitutional a legislative act," they "thwart[] the will of
representatives of the actual people of the here and now."'" The justices in none of the naked land cases "declared unconstitutional a legislative act' in the very narrow sense of including in the majority
opinion a declaratory sentence asserting that a federal law was being
held unconstitutional. The Pollard's Lessee line of decisions voided
federal laws without uttering the magic words; the Polk's Lessee and
Percheman lines illustrate how the Supreme Court may assert consti-

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 133 (1810).
9.
10. See infra notes 141-97 and accompanying text.
11. Polk's Lessee v. Wendal & Al, 13 U.S. (8 Cranch) 87 (1815). A later incarnation of this
case was called Polk's Lessee v. Wendell, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 293 (1820). The original case was
sometimes cited by that name, as Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, as Polk's Lessee v. Wendall, or as
Polk's Lessee v. Windel.
12. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
13. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
14. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
18.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE

BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1986).
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tutional limits on the power of federal and state officials without expressly declaring a law unconstitutional. More significantly, Bickel's
countermajoritarian model erroneously assumes that exercises of
judicial review necessarily reject the constitutional understandings of
"the prevailing majority."19 Polk's Lessee, Percheman, and Pollard's
Lessee articulated a constitutional ban on government expropriation of
private property that was endorsed by virtually every prominent
political actor. A Congress committed to consensual property norms
occasionally violated those values by accident or oversight, but was
more than willing to allow federal courts to void those legislative
mistakes that inadvertently granted to B property that already belonged to A. These cases highlight various conditions under which the
Supreme Court can impose limits on federal power without "thwarting
the will
of the actual representatives of the people of the here and
20
now."
The Taney Court's decision declaring unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise" was consistent with the general tenor of
antebellum practice in constitutional cases, and was not an aberration
that resulted when the desire to place a pro-slavery imprimatur on the
Constitution overcame the normal practice of judicial restraint.' The
cases discussed in this Article demonstrate that the Taney Court was
more than willing to declare constitutional limits on state power.
Major national statutes were not declared unconstitutional before the
Civil War because the justices lacked the opportunity to do so, not the
will. Constitutionally-controversial policies in Jacksonian America
that were not vetted by the national legislature were almost always
vetoed by the national executive.' Southern political efforts during
the 1850s to have slavery issues resolved by the Supreme Court make
sense only if, in light of the naked land transfer and other cases, proslavery advocates had good reason to believe that the justices had few
qualms about restricting national power.'
This Article explores the naked land transfer cases decided by
the antebellum Supreme Court. The follow pages demonstrate the
doctrinal significance of Polk's Lessee and related cases, discuss their
role in the establishment of judicial review and the development of

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
22. For the traditional view of Dred Scott, see ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN
SUPREME COURT 60 (2d ed. 1994).
23. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of Chase Court Activism, __ J. OF SUP. CT.
HISTORY (forthcoming 2000).
24. See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
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fundamental rights jurisprudence in the United States, and challenge
the prevailing countermajoritarian model of judicial review most
commonly associated with Alexander Bickel.' Part I details the variety of cases in which antebellum Supreme Court justices relied on the
constitutional ban on naked land transfers, and discusses whether
these cases are best labeled as exercises of judicial review, statutory
interpretation, or some mixture of the two. Part II highlights the
various techniques the antebellum justices used in naked land transfer and other cases to restrain federal power. The frequency with
which Marshall and Taney Court justices handed down opinions imposing constitutional limits on the federal government suggests that
judicial review of federal legislation was a fairly common practice before the Civil War. Part III points out how judicial review may occur
even when elected officials and justices agree on basic constitutional
limitations, and details how the naked land cases were an important
missing link in the eventual establishment of judicial review. Judicial
review may have survived and thrived before the Civil War because
the justices spent much time and energy implementing general principles of property recognized as valid by virtually every prominent
political actor.
The understandable neglect of those relatively obscure nineteenth-century land cases that limited federal power is nevertheless
unfortunate for numerous normative and historical reasons. Normative scholarship, obsessed by Bickel's countermajoritarian difficulty, 6
never acknowledges that the majority, probably the substantial majority, of Supreme Court decisions limiting state or federal power
raised issues that failed to excite the body politic or even a substantial
number of political elites. Understood in their political contexts, judicial review in cases involving such matters as the ownership of a particular parcel of land in Missouri or the ownership of land below the
high water mark of rivers in Alabama could not have been countermajoritarian in an important theoretical sense. No will of the people
or of the elected representatives of the people existed for the justices
to thwart. Popular and legislative majorities lacked the interest in the
constitutional controversy necessary to form any opinion on the proper
constitutional resolution. One even wonders how many persons who
teach constitutional law, history, or politics could identify the holding
of most cases where the Supreme Court has declared a state or federal

25.

See BICKEL, supra note 18, at 17.

26. See Barry Friedman, The History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part One: The
Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 334 (1998) (describing the
"countermajoritarian difficulty" as the "central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship).
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law unconstitutional. When thinking about the role the federal judiciary has and should play in the American constitutional order, therefore, commentators should begin by recognizing that the political history and salience of the typical judicial decision declaring a law
unconstitutional more often resembles Pollard's Lessee than either
7
Dred Scott or Brown v. Board of Education."
Historical scholarship would benefit by acknowledging that
these politically inconsequential cases may have played a central role
in the process by which judicial review was established in the United
States. The line of decisions limiting federal power from Marbury to
Pollard's Lessee established important legal and political precedents
for the judicial power to declare federal laws unconstitutional. By routinizing the process of judicial review in politically uninteresting matters, the Marshall and Taney Courts fostered beliefs that the judiciary
was the appropriate forum for resolving all controversial
constitutional issues.28 The institution that most politicians agree
should determine whether the federal government is constitutionally
authorized to lease public land,29 after all, has a strong claim to being
the institution that should determine whether the federal government
is constitutionally authorized to ban slavery on public lands. The
antebellum judicial practice of first declaring a constitutional limit on
government and then (mis)interpreting federal statutes as consistent
with that limit proved an important and ignored bridge between anteand post-bellum exercises of judicial review. The Chase Court explicitly declared more laws unconstitutional than the Taney Court in
part because Chase Court justices were more willing to interpret statutes as violating agreed-upon constitutional limits.'
II. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
A. Fletcher v. Peck Revisited
The Marshall Court first articulated the basic principles underlying the constitutional ban on naked land transfers in Fletcher v.

27. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

28. For further development of this point, see Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial
Review?: Schooner Peggy and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221 (1998); see also
Mark A. Graber, The ProblematicEstablishment of JudicialReview, in THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 28 (Howard Gillman & Cornell

Clayton eds., 1999).
29. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
30. See infra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
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Peck." The precise issue before the Court in that case was whether a
Georgia law rescinding an earlier land grant procured through bribery
could constitutionally be applied to persons who previous to the recission had purchased the property from the original malfeasors unaware
of their misconduct." The Marshall Court's decision voiding the recission is routinely treated at present as an application of Contracts
Clause principles." Chief Justice John Marshall, however, conceptualized the issues as concerning state power to expropriate private
property. The bulk of his opinion in Fletcher constitutionalized on
general principles certain elements of the common law of property.
The Contracts Clause served only as an alternative ground for the last
step in Marshall's reasoning. Later cases suggested that the Contract
Clause discussion in Fletcher played almost no role in the final analysis. Supreme Court justices and counsel before that tribunal consistently cited the principles of Fletcheras limiting both federal and state
power, even though the Contracts Clause explicitly limits only the
power of state governments."
Marshall's opinion in Fletcher first defended on common law
grounds the property rights of persons who, oblivious to the original
swindle, had purchased the disputed Yazoo lands. In his view, "purchasers of a legal estate without knowledge of any secret fraud which
might have led to the emanation of the original grant" held good title
to their property. 5 Without citing any positive constitutional law,
Marshall ruled that "certain great principles of justice"' constitutionally obligated legislatures to recognize the distinction between void
and voidable title." 'The rights of third persons, who are purchasers
without notice, for a valuable consideration," he wrote:
cannot be disregarded. Titles which, according to every legal test, are perfect, are
acquired with that confidence which is inspired by the opinion that the purchaser is

safe. If there be any concealed defect, arising from the conduct of those who had held
the property long before he acquired it, of which he had no notice, that concealed defect
cannot be set up against him. He has paid his money for a title good at law, he is
innocent, whatever may be the guilt of others, and equity will not subject him to the

31. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
32. The Fletcher Court clearly ruled that the recision law could be constitutionally applied
to the land still being held by the original grantees. See id. at 133.
33. See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEENM. SULLIVAN, CONsTITUTIONAL LAw 506 (13th
ed. 1997).
34. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
35. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 135.
36. Id. at 133.
37. See Christopher I. Eisgruber, John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
439, 466-68 (1996). For a good summary of the distinction between void and voidable, see
Timothy Arnold Barnes, The Plain Meaning of the Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy: The
Void/Voidable DistinctionRevisited, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 291, 306-08 (1996).
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penalties attached to that guilt. All titles would be insecure, and the intercourse between man38 and man would be very seriously obstructed, if this principle be
overturned.

The Contracts Clause played no role in this analysis of the initial
property rights at issue in Fletcher.
Once Marshall determined that the subsequent purchasers
held good title to the disputed property at the time Georgia passed the
rescinding act, he then asserted that the sole constitutional issue
Fletcher raised was whether governing officials could expropriate private property. "If the legislature felt itself absolved from those rules
of property which are common to all the citizens of the United States,"
Marshall asserted, "its act is to be supported by its power alone, and
the same power may divest any other individual of his lands, if it shall
be the will of the legislature so to exert it."39 'The principle, on which
alone this rescinding act is to be supported," he continued, "is this:
that a legislature may... divest the vested estate of any man whatever, for reasons which shall, by itself, be deemed sufficient.""0 These
statements suggest that for unexplained constitutional reasons, the
Marshall Court would not permit legislators to alter "those rules of
property which are common to all citizens of the United States.""' So
understood, Fletcher apparently holds that "certain great principles of
justice" would be violated should a state pass legislation preventing
persons who acquired property by fraud from passing good title to an
innocent purchaser. Whether the original land grant was procured
from the government by bribery was no longer relevant to the constitutional issue. Fletcher, in Marshall's opinion, concerned the power of
a state to make naked land transfers, to divest any person whose
original acquisition of the property in dispute was valid under common law.
The Supreme Court in Fletcher held that such naked land
transfers violated both natural/common law 2 and the Contracts
Clause. Marshall maintained that "[t]he state of Georgia was restrained either by general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the

38. Fletcher,10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 133-34.
39. Id. at 134, 136 (describing the issue in the case as concerning "the act of transferring the
property of an individual to the public!).
40. Id. at 134.
41. Id.
42. Scholars debate the extent to which Marshall's opinion in Fletcher regarded natural law
or common law as the ultimate source of the "certain great principles of justice" that bound
elected officials. See Eisgruber, supra note 37, at 468 n.119 (common law); Suzanna Sherry, The
Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1170-71 (1987) (natural law).

2000]

NAKED LAND TRANSFERS

United States." 3 Both prohibited states "from passing a law whereby
the estate of the plaintiff in the premises legally so purchased could be
constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null and void."4
Common law provided the principles by which land tenure was ascertained and banned naked land transfers. The Contracts Clause was
relevant in Fletcher only because Marshall insisted that the initial
state grant "implie[d] a contract not to re-assert" the right of ownership,45 which is a contractual right that could be asserted by subsequent purchasers of that property.
Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Fletcher would have
struck down the Georgia repeal solely on natural law grounds." Johnson rejected the part of Marshall's opinion holding that all government
land grants contained an implied promise not to re-assert ownership.
"A grant or conveyance," Johnson declared, "by no means necessarily
implies the continuance of an obligation, beyond the moment of executing it.""" Hence, his concurrence was "not founded on the provision
in the constitution of the United States, relative to laws impairing the
obligation of contracts."4' 8 Georgia fulfilled its contractual obligations
by giving the original Yazoo landholders title to land. The Contracts
Clause said nothing about whether Georgia could re-take the land under, for example, the power of eminent domain.'
Johnson regarded Fletcher as correctly decided because the recision law violated the ban on naked land transfers. Georgia was
claiming title to the land, rather than the power of eminent domain.
Justice Johnson was confident that a court of justice could not allow
such a claim, because "a state does not possess the power of revoking
its own grants. '
"When the legislature have once conveyed their
interest property in any subject to the individual," the justice from
South Carolina wrote, "they have lost all control over it; have nothing
to act upon; it has passed from them; is vested in the individual."51
The source of this prohibition, however, was not positive constitutional
law. Rather, Johnson's opinion was grounded in "a general principle,.., the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose
laws even on the Deity."'

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 143-44 (Johnson, J., concurring).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 144.
See id. at 145.
Id. at 143.

51. Id.
52. Id.

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:73

This use of general principles in the Fletcher opinions as the
sole or alternative ground for the decision was particularly important
for the ultimate resolution of the dispute over the Yazoo lands. By the
time the case was decided, Georgia had ceded full sovereignty over all
the territory involved to the United States.' The real issue in 1810
was whether Congress, to some degree, would recognize the claims of
those persons who claimed title by virtue of the first grant from Georgia. Thus, while Fletcheris nominally a decision about constitutional
limits on state power, by relying more "on general principles which are
common to our free institutions,"' the justices, at the very least,
strongly implied that the federal government would also be constitutionally obligated to respect the property rights set out in their opinions. Indeed, Fletcher seems to have influenced the eventual federal
decision to partly compensate the "innocent' Yazoo landholders."
Subsequent legal cases made clear: (1) that the Supreme Court
did not need the Contracts Clause to void government efforts to rescind land grants, and (2) that the result in Fletcher would have been
no different had an identical national law been before the justices. A
unanimous Supreme Court in 1862 asserted that the federal government was bound to respect the obligation of federal contracts as those
obligations were understood by John Marshall and his brethren in
Fletcher.' Justice Nathan Clifford's majority opinion in Rice v. Railroad Co. cited Fletcherfor the proposition that "if the legal effect of the
act of Congress" at issue "was to grant to the Territory a beneficial interest in the lands, then it is equally clear that it was not competent
for Congress to pass the repealing act, and divest the title."7 Justice
Samuel Nelson's dissent agreed:
It is well settled in this court that grants [of land], when made by the Legislature of a
State, cannot be recalled, and we do not perceive any reason why the inviolability of
the same class of grants should be less when made by the legislative power of the
General Government.58

53. For the details noted in this paragraph, see C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOo: LAW AND
POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF FLETCHER V.PECK 32-36, 112 (1966).
54. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139.
55. See MAGRATH, supranote 53, at 112.
56. See Rice v. Railroad Co., 66 U.S. (1 Black) 358, 374 (1862).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 382-83 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see also Gerald L. Newman, Whose Constitution?,
100 YALE L.J. 909, 955 (1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court was unanimous in assuming that an act of
Congress retracting a vested right to tracts of land would be void.'). Counsel in a previous case
had similarly claimed that a federal law was "intended to impair the obligation of contracts," but
the justices did not reach the issue. Christy v. Scott, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 282, 288 (1853). The
Marshall Court in 1832 had similarly cited Fletcherfor the proposition that no government could
re-grant land already granted. See United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 738 (1832)
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The only issue that divided the justices in Rice was whether Congress
had, in fact, surrendered certain rights to the public domain. Justice
Clifford declared that Congress had acted constitutionally because the
national government had retained full ownership of the lands in question." Justice Nelson would have declared the law at issue in Rice unconstitutional because he believed Congress was attempting to reacquire lands that had been granted away.' No justice in Rice noted
that the Contracts Clause, under which Fletcher was nominally decided, only limited state power.
Counsel in numerous antebellum cases similarly asserted that
the national government was bound to respect the principles asserted
in Fletcher. On at least eight occasions, attorneys asked the Supreme
Court to void a federal land grant as inconsistent with that judicial
ruling in 1810.61 In no case was this claim disputed either by opposing
counsel or by any judicial opinion. Indeed, as late as 1870, no justice
was willing to declare that the federal government could impair the
obligation of contracts. Chief Justice Chase's dissent that year in the
Legal Tender Cases cited Fletcher as establishing a ban on both federal and state actions that either impaired the obligation of contract or
resulted in a naked land transfer. 2 Justice Strong's opinion for the
Court did not challenge Chase's assertion that the principles of
Fletcherlimited both federal and state legislatures. His response was
only that "it cannot... be maintained that the legal tender acts
impaired the obligation of contracts,"' a statement implying that a
federal law impairing the obligation of contracts would be unconstitutional.
Fletcher also indicates that the Marshall Court was far more
willing to limit state power than scholars have realized. Understood

(discussed infra at Part 1.B). Justice Levi Woodbury, when in Congress, had maintained that
the federal government was bound by the Contracts Clause. See CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 2d
Sess. 253-54 (1841).
59. See Rice, 66 U.S. (1 Black) at 375-81.
60. Id. at 383-85 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
61. See Hooper v. Schmeimer, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 235, 239 (1860) (argument of Mr. StiUwell);
Roberts v. Cooper, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 467, 475 (1857) (argument of Mr. Vinton); Cooper v.
Roberts, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 173, 174 (1856) (argument of Mr. Buel and Mr. Vinton); Doe v.
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 644 (1853) (argument of Mr. Mayer); Rundle v. Delaware &
Raritan Canal Co., 55 U.S. (14 How.) 80, 83 (1853) (argument of Mr. Ashmead and Mr. Vroom);
Marsh v. Brooks, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 513, 519 (1853) (argument of Mr. Geyer); Marsh v. Brooks,
49 U.S. (8 How.) 223, 229 (1850) (argument of Mr. May and Mr. Geyer); Bissell v. Penrose, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 317, 326 (1850).
62. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 581 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting); see also
HAROLD M. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER &
TEXAS V. WHITE 153 (1997).
63. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 549.
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as a case that forbade state legislatures from granting to B property
that belonged to A, Fletcher dramatically limits the significance of
antebellum judicial decisions holding that the Fifth Amendment and
other provisions of the Bill of Rights only limited the power of the national government.' If the origin of all title to American soil was a
government grant, then under Fletcher any state taking of land without compensation would violate the Contracts Clause of Article I or,
more accurately, those "general principles" that prohibited all government officials from granting land owned by other persons. Moreover, as noted above, Marshall's opinion seemed to reject any state
expropriation, and not simply expropriation of land originally granted
by the state. Thus, aggrieved landholders had no need to plead the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment when attacking state legislation divesting them of title to their property. Fletcher provided
sufficient precedential support for their right against naked land
transfers. At most, such cases as Barron v. City of Baltimore permitted state regulatory takings, or state action that destroyed the
value of property without taking title.6 5 These governmental policies
were thought consistent with "certain great principles of justice."' As
Stephen Siegel notes, constitutional law before the Civil War "generally protected the possession of property, but not the value of that
possession. '
Professor Siegel's analysis may partly explain the subsequent
separation of Contract Clause and natural/common law analysis in
Supreme Court opinions. His thorough analysis of antebellum legal
concepts observes that while Americans at this time generally agreed
on "the sanctity of contracts entered into by individuals in the exercise
of their common law rights," they disputed the extent to which those
principles should apply to "state-granted franchises."68 "Nearly ninety
percent" of the cases after Fletcher that the Supreme Court decided on
contracts clause principles, Siegel notes, "involved state-granted franchises, mainly corporate charters."6 Reliance on the Contract Clause
made sense in these circumstances. Corporations do not exist in nature. The rules for their regulation, as well as the rights of corporate
owners, must be found in positive, not natural, law. The land cases

64. See, e.g., Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250-51 (1833).
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (5 Dall.) 87, 133 (1810)).
67. Stephen A. Siegel, Understandingthe Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of
the Property-PrivilegeDistinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence,60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 87
(1986).
68. Id. at 8.
69. Id. at 7.
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the Supreme Court heard in the wake of Fletcher, by comparison,
typically concerned charges that governing officials had granted to B
property that belonged to A. This allegation raised fundamental
natural law issues-issues the justices would resolve by reference to
general principles rather than by positive constitutional law.
B. The Legacy of Polk's Lessee
Five years after handing down Fletcher,the Marshall Court indicated in Polk's Lessee v. Wendal & Al' that natural/common law
principles would be used as sources of law should the government
grant to B property belonging to A. The issue in Polk's Lessee was
whether a litigant in an ejectment case could "impeach a grant [of
land] from the state" to a third party on the ground that the state had
1 The second
previously granted the land in question to the litigant.Y
grantee maintained that courts were obligated to consider the most
recent government grant to be conclusive evidence as to who had valid
title to the disputed land. This argument followed from the general
rule that the most recent legislative enactment is considered to be the
authoritative source of law. As a general rule, any statutory provision
inconsistent with subsequent legislation is deemed repealed.72 Chief
Justice John Marshall, writing for a unanimous court in Polk's Lessee,
held that claims of prior ownership could be litigated."' In his view, a
subsequent government land grant could not repeal a previous land
grant. "[A] grant is absolutely void," Marshall held, when "the state
has no title to the thing granted." 74
Marshall did not clearly state the source or nature of this ban
on naked land transfers. Some early passages in his opinion suggest
that resort to general principles was necessary only because the precise issue before the court was undecided under Tennessee law. 5
Other passages indicate that the ban on state expropriation of private
property was one of "the great principles of justice and law" that no
government could violate, even by clear statutory enactment. As was
the case with Justice Johnson's concurring opinion in Fletcher, Mar-

70. Polk's Lessee v. Wendel & Al, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 87 (1815).
71. Id. at 98.
72. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
A'rITUDINAL MODEL 3 (1993) ("[l]t is an elementary legal principle that later language erases
incompatible earlier language.').
73. See Polk's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 99.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 98 (noting that Tennessee had not established rules for determining who obtained
the first grant).
76. Id. at 98-99.
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shall's opinion in Polk's Lessee provides no textual source for this
"great principle of justice and law." That government could not grant
to B land that belonged to A seemed sufficiently obvious as to obviate
the need for any detailed explication of the foundations for that limit
on state power.
Later cases established that Polk's Lessee was based on an unenumerated constitutional prohibition against government expropriation of private property. Justice Smith Thompson in 1826 never mentioned state law when citing Polk's Lessee as authoritative in a suit
over the ownership of land in Georgia.' The next year, the justices
cited both Fletcher and the Contracts Clause as a source for the ban on
naked land transfers by state officials. 8 In neither Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn nor Williams v. Norris did the Marshall Court consider
whether under the relevant state law the second grantee obtained
good title when state authorities had made successive grants of the
same property. Past precedent and "general principles of justice" were
the grounds for these judicial decisions.
Six years later, in United States v. Arredondo, the justices specifically ruled that no government official, state or federal, could sell
or give away land that did not belong to that government." Justice
Henry Baldwin's unanimous opinion asserted that no matter what
language was used in the actual grant, government grants of land
conveyed only the government interest in that land. "A grant, even by
act of Parliament, which conveys a title good against the king," he declared, "takes away no right of property from any other; though it contains no savings clause, it passes no other right than that of the public, although the grant is general of the land."' Baldwin cited Fletcher
as the precedential source for the principle that "[i]f land is granted by
a state, its legislative power is incompetent to annul the grant and
grant the land to another; such law is void."8' Therefore, Arredondo
clearly held this ban on successive grants applied to both the local and
national authorities. After concluding that Arredondo had valid title
to the property being litigated, Justice Baldwin's opinion, with specific

77. See Doe ex dem. Patterson v. Winn, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 380, 382-84 (1826).
78. See Williams v. Norris, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 117, 125 (1827); see also Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 75-76 (1823) (relying on "principles of law and reason" to bar naked land
transfers).
79. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 738 (1832).
80. Id.
81. HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 148-49 (1970) (citing Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6
Cranch) 87 (1810)).
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reference to Congress, stated: "such lands were not liable to subsequent appropriation by a subsequent grant."'
This ban on naked land transfers was frequently reiterated by
various justices during Marshall's last years on the Court. The year
Arredondo was decided, the justices unanimously asserted in another
case "that on general principles, it is incontestable that a grantee can
convey no more than he possesses."' "It is a principle applicable to
every grant," Marshall declared during his final term on the bench,
"that it cannot affect pre-existing titles."' Marshall Court justices by
1835 could and did cite numerous precedents for this legal rule. No
opinion, however, detailed the positive constitutional law foundations
for this ban on state and federal expropriation.
After Marshall's death, the Supreme Court remained committed to preventing naked land transfers. A unanimous Supreme Court
reaffirmed Arredondo in 1836, the first year Marshall did not preside
over that tribunal. Justice John McLean's opinion in Mayor of New
Orleans v. United States asserted that a "grant has been frequently
issued by the United States for land which had been previously
granted; and the second grant has been held to be inoperative."''
McLean then immediately referred to a specific instance where the
justices had ruled against a federal grantee because the land in question had previously been granted to a third party.' By the end of the
nineteenth century, Supreme Court opinions explicitly declared that
"ever since the decision in Polk's Lessee v. Wendall, [sic] it has been
the settled law of this court that a patent is void at law if the grantor
State had no title to the premises embraced in it."" No clear explanation was ever given of what constitutional (or statutory) provision, if
any, was the source of this "settled law."
The Taney Court proved particularly vigilant in naked land
transfer cases. Unanimous or majority opinions in antebellum land
decisions handed down during the Jacksonian era contain such sentences as "[a] patent is utterly void and inoperative, which is issued
for land that had been previously patented to another individual,"' or
"[t]he President of the United States has no right to issue patents for

82. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 735.
83. Sampeyreac v. United States, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 222, 241 (1833); see also Arredondo, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) at 731.
84. Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. (14 Pet.) 224, 236 (1835); see also Lessee of
Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (9 Pet.) 353, 391 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
85. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 731 (1836).
86. See id. The case in question may be Wallace v. Parker,31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 680 (1832).
87. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 176 (1891).
88. Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 284, 318 (1844); see also Sampeyreac, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) at 238-41.
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land, the sale of which is not authorized by law." 9 These principles
were central to the holding in many decisions. In at least three cases,
the justices invalidated a federal land grant on the ground that a third
party already had valid title to the property in question." The most
famous beneficiary of this largess was John Sanford (or more accurately, his heirs), who during the 1857 term managed to convince the
Supreme Court to void both the Missouri Compromise and a federal
grant of his land to another party (though not to spell his last name
correctly in either opinion!)."
The Taney Court also engaged in statutory misconstruction to
prevent an unconstitutional land transfer. The justices in Lytle v.
Arkansas interpreted a federal law granting land to a township as
only granting land that had not been previously appropriated.
Nothing in the federal statute granting the land suggested that restriction on the right to choose. The plain meaning of the text was ignored for the sole reason that a literal interpretation of federal law
would unconstitutionally take from A and give to B. "By grant to
Arkansas," Justice McLean's unanimous opinion declared, "Congress
could not have intended to impair vested rights."93 No evidence of actual legislative intent was given to support this assertion. Indeed, the
justices in Lytle held that the plaintiff had good title to the disputed
land even though federal officials had previously ruled that the plaintiff had not met the statutory requirements for land ownership.'

89. Easton v. Salisbury, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 426, 431-32 (1858) (holding that such sales were
"absolutely void").
90. See Willot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 79, 82 (1857) (explaining that 1816
confirmation defeats 1836 confirmation because "where there are two confirmations for the same
land, the elder must hold it); Delauriere v. Emison, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 525, 538 (1854) ("The
confirmation of the claim by Congress, in 1836, had relation back to the origin of the title; but it
could not impair rights which had accrued, when the land was unprotected by a reservation from
sale; and when, in fact, the right of the claimant was barred.'); Chouteau v. Eckhart, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 344 (1844) (holding claim confirmed in 1812 defeats claim confirmed in 1836); see also
United States v. Covilland, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 339, 341 (1862) ("[A] confirmation in the name of
the original grantee, divesting the legal title of the United States, is binding on the government
and on the assignees.'); Landes v. Brant, 51 U.S. 348, 370 (1851) ("[W]hen Congress confirmed
and completed an imperfect claim, and then confirmed another and different claim-for the same
land, the older confirmation defeated the younger one."); Marsh v. Brooks, 49 U.S. (8How.) 223,
233-34 (1850) ("[W]here the same land has been twice granted, the elder patent may be set up in
a defence by a trespasser, when sued by a claimant under the younger grant.'); Les Bois v.
Bramell, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 449, 463 (1846) (holding confirmations must yield to prior
confirmations); Stoddard v. Chambers, 43 U.S. 284, 317 (1844) ("[T]he elder legal title must
prevail in the action of ejectment.").
91. See Willot, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 82.
92. Lytle v. Arkansas, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 314, 334-35 (1850).
93. Id. at 335.
94. Id.
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Hence, even if Congress never intended that the township appropriate
land that all agreed was owned by third parties, federal officials had
previously decided that the disputed land in Lytle was still owned by
the federal government. Statutory language and previous federal actions to the contrary, however, the justices in Lytle concluded that federal law did not empower the national government to grant the disputed land. 'The grants of the thousand acres and of the other tracts,"
Justice McLean concluded, "must be so construed as not to interfere
with the preemption of [the claimant under the original grant].""
Lytle articulated a constitutional principle of statutory construction that essentially enabled the Supreme Court to prevent the
federal government from selling private land without ever having to
declare a federal statute unconstitutional. Government could not expropriate land because no law would be interpreted as expropriating
land. The Marshall Court articulated this statutory canon in several
cases, declaring:
[w]hatever the legislative power may be, its acts ought never to be so construed as to
subvert the rights of property, unless its intention to do so shall be expressed in such
terms as to admit of no doubt, and to show a clear design to effect the object. No
general terms intended for property, to which they may be fairly applicable and not
particularly applied by the legislature, no silent implied and constructive repeals ought
ever to be understood as to divest a vested right.9 6

Justice Johnson more bluntly declared that "the State never intends to
grant the lands of another."" When the State makes grants, he wrote,
it "enters into contract no farther than that the purchaser shall have
that quantity of vacant land if he can find it.""
Taney Court justices adopted similar rules of construction,
leaving out, significantly, those clauses indicating that more explicit
language might be construed as impairing vested rights. 'Vhensoever
a tract of land shall have once been legally appropriated to any purpose," Justice Barbour declared in Wilcox v. Jackson, "no subsequent
law, or proclamation, or sale, would be construed to embrace it, or to
operate upon it; although no reservation were made of it."' Justice
Baldwin similarly asserted that "a patent from the United
States... could not operate to destroy any previous existing title.""
In short, no matter what the text of the relevant statute said, the

95. Id.
96. United States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 733 (1832) (quoting Rutherford v.
Greene's Heirs, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 196, 203 (1817)); see also BALDWIN, supra note 81, at 146.
97. Doe ex dem. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 332, 359 (1826).
98. Id.
99. Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839).
100. Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 391 (1840) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring).
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antebellum Court interpreted all federal land grants as merely
granting the federal interest in the land. In cases where the land was
previously owned, the statute was not unconstitutional-the law
merely granted nothing to the grantee. No statute could be declared
unconstitutional under this approach to statutory interpretation only
because no matter what the statutory language or indicia of legislative
intent, no statute would ever be interpreted as dictating an unconstitutional naked land transfer.
This constitutional ban on the sale of land previously granted
extended to land granted by foreign governments at a time when the
territory in question was indisputably under foreign control. Taney
Court justices did rule that the United States was not constitutionally
obligated to recognize foreign grants of land that were claimed by the
United States at the time of the grant. ° ' Still, the justices repeatedly
insisted that persons had constitutional rights to any land validly
granted by a foreign power before the territory was acquired by the
United States. "[W]here the land had been rightfully granted before
the cession," the Court declared in Garcia v. Lee, "it did not need the
aid of an act of congress to ratify and confirm the grant.'' 01 2 "Such a
title," the Court in Eslavaopined, "is not to be affected or regulated by
the political authorities to whom a country is afterwards ceded, any
more or otherwise than any private rights and property of the inhabitants of such a country."'0 ' Justice Levi Woodbury's opinion further
declared:
[a]nd when a party, holding such complete title, is encroached upon, he should find
protection in the judicial tribunals.... Chief Justice Marshall says .... 'The king cedes
that only which belonged to him. Lands he had previously granted were not his to
cede." And the complete title to them before obtained is strengthened by no
confirmation from the United States, who have acquired no interest in them. 04

101. See Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 511, 518 (1838). Justice Baldwin, however, insisted
that "grants of land in a disputed territory, by a government de facto, in possession, are valid."
Lessee of Pollard'sHeirs, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 410 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
102. Garcia, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 519; see also Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S.
161, 184 (1891) ('Irrespective of any such provision in the treaty, the obligations resting upon the
United States in this respect, under the principles of international law, would have been the
same."); Lessee of Pollard'sHeirs, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 421 (Baldwin, J., concurring) ("[W]ithout
the acts of 1824 or 1836, the plaintiffs' title was as valid as with their aid."); United States v.
Arredondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691, 742 (1832) ("[When the territory was ceded, the United States
had no right in any of the lands embraced in the confirmed grants."); Soulard v. United States,
29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 511-12 (1829) ('In the treaty by which Louisiana was acquired, the United
States stipulated that the inhabitants of the ceded territory should be protected in the free
enjoyment of their property.").
103. Doe ex dem. Barbarie v. Eslava, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 421, 445 (1850).
104. Id. (quoting United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833)); see also Lessee
of Pollard'sHeirs, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 390-91, 409 (Baldwin, J., concurring) ("[When a territory
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The Supreme Court's decisions in the foreign land grant cases
demonstrated the same indifference to positive statutory law as did
the cases concerned with successive land grants by the same governing agency. In both lines of decisions, federal justices ruled the precise
language in the federal code or in federal treaties was not relevant to
the actual decision. The federal government could not grant land that
under common or international law was owned by a private party.
Whether such grants were permitted by statute or treaty was, at most,
only mentioned in passing. It was as if the justices in 1850 ruled on
general principles that states could not impose the death penalty for
blasphemy, not bothering to explore whether any state law actually
imposed capital punishment for that crime.
1. Constitutional, Statutory, or Other
This judicial disinclination to consider the text of most federal
land grants complicates efforts to determine whether many Supreme
Court decisions forbidding naked land transfers actually declared federal laws unconstitutional. A clear statutory ground for voiding the
federal grant usually existed. Congress was aware that ascertaining
ownership of land in the territories and in the new states was extremely difficult. Both the national legislature and executive branch
officials in the field were known to grant land accidentally that had
previously been validly obtained by third parties. One case arose after
both the title of the plaintiff and of the defendant to the same land
was "confirmed at the same time and by the same act of Congress. " "
Acknowledging the constitutional rule permitting the national government to grant only those lands owned by the national government,
Congress included in virtually every public and private federal land
grant language clearly stating that the national government had only
granted whatever federal interest existed in that land."
Federal
statutes typically contained such reservations as:

is acquired by treaty, cession, or even conquest, the rights of the inhabitants to property are
respected and sacred.'); Letter from Nathan Clifford to John M. Clayton (Sept. 6, 1849), in
NATHAN CLIFFORD: DEMOCRAT 238-39 (Philip Greely Clifford ed., 1922). In his letter, Clifford
wrote:
All will agree, I suppose, that the treaty, in stipulating for the protection and
maintenance of property, gives full confirmation to complete legal titles to lands. In
giving this protection to property the treaty does no more than affirm a principle often
recognized by the Supreme Court, that the United States, as a just nation, would support
such titles although there was no treaty stipulation to that effect.
105. Eslava,50 U.S. (9 How.) at 448.
106. See, e.g., Les Bois v. Bramell, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 449, 463 (1846).
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[t]hat if it shall be found that any tract or tracts
thereof, had been previously located by any other
the United States, or had been surveyed and sold
confer no title to such lands in opposition to the
purchase.10
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confirmed as aforesaid, or any part
person or persons under any law of
by the United States, this act shall
rights acquired by such location or

Another statute declared, "nothing in this act contained shall be construed to affect the claim or claims, if any such there be, of any individual or individuals, or of any body politic or corporate."" Federal
treaties included similar language. Whenever the United States acquired territory from a foreign nation, the cession grant included a
provision "stipulat[ing] that the inhabitants of the ceded territory
should be protected in the free enjoyment of their property."" Justice
Baldwin pointed out that "[e]very public act of Congress from 1803 till
1813" concerning the Louisiana territory "contained an express guarantee of property."... Thus, in an important sense, the national government avoided passing laws unconstitutionally taking from A and
giving to B. Savings clauses were placed in all statutes and treaties
declaring that no title would pass in any instance where the result
would be an unconstitutional naked land transfer.
Still, important reasons exist for not treating these Taney and
Marshall Court land cases as conventional instances of statutory interpretation. The most important reason is that antebellum tribunals
did not treat these land cases as presenting simple questions of statutory interpretation. Judicial opinions repeatedly insisted that the federal government could not grant land the United States or a foreign
government had previously granted, even if the relevant law lacked a
savings clause. 'The United States," the Marshall Court ruled in
Soulard v. United States, "regard this stipulation as the avowal of a
principle which would have been held equally sacred, though it had
not been inserted in the contract.""' "Irrespective of any such provision in the treaty" protecting existing titles, Justice Lamar similarly

107. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 361, 5 Stat. 126, 126-27 (1836) (confirming claims to land in

Missouri).
108. Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 185, 4 Stat. 66, 69 (1824) (granting certain lots of grounds to
the city of Mobile, and to certain individuals therein).
109. Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 511-12 (1829); see, e.g., Act of May 8,
1822, ch. 129, § 5, 3 Stat. 709, 718 (1822) (for ascertaining claims and titles to land within the
territory of Florida); see also James K. Polk, To the House of Representativesof the United States,
Jan. 2, 1849, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897
(Volume IV) at 2522-28 (James D. Richardson ed., 1897) [hereinafter MESSAGES AND PAPERS].
110. Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 353, 375 (1840) (Baldwin, J.,
concurring).
111. Soulard,29 U.S. (4 Pet.) at 512.
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declared, "the obligations resting upon the United States,... under
the principles of international law, would have been the same.""
Opinions noting the savings clause often did so only to declare
that statutory provision superfluous. In Percheman, John Marshall
explained that "a cession of territory is never understood to be a cession of the property belonging to its inhabitants."" In his view, "that
sense of justice and of right which is acknowledged and felt by the
whole civilized world" meant that "[h] ad Florida changed its sovereign
by an act containing no stipulation respecting the property of individuals, the right of property in all those who became subjects or
citizens of the new government would have been unaffected by the
change.".. Some antebellum cases denying title to the second grantee
explicitly rely on the savings clause as the ground of decision."' More
often, the justices never mentioned the existence of the savings clause.
For example, in Willot v. Sandford"' the Court held that the federal
government could not under any conditions grant to B land that belonged to A. At no point did the Court, in Willot or any other case,
suggest that its decision was limited to the statutory proposition that
the federal government, under "An Act confirming certain claims to
land in the State of Missouri" (or the like), could not grant to B land
that belonged to A." Such a holding would have more clearly left
open the possibility that the justices were prepared to sustain a federal law granting private property should the statute in question explicitly assert the power to make a naked land transfer.
Scholars classify the Chase Court's decision in Reichart v.
Felps"' as an exercise of judicial review"9 even though the case does
not differ in any relevant way from the numerous Marshall and Taney
Court land cases that have not been so classified. The crucial sentence in Reichart explains that, "Congress is bound to regard the public treaties, and it had no power to organize a board of revision to

112. Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 184 (1891); Polk, supra note 109, at
2534 ("[l]f the ninth article of the treaty [ending the Mexican war) ... had been entirely
omitted.... all the rights and privileges which either of them confers would have been secured to
the inhabitants of the ceded territories by the Constitution and laws of the United States.").
113. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 87 (1833).
114. Id. at 86-87, 88.
115. See, e.g., Mills v. Stoddard, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 345, 364-65 (1851); Bissell v. Penrose, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 317, 336-37 (1850); City of Mobile v. Emanuel, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 95, 100 (1843); City
of Mobile v. Hallett, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 261, 263 (1842).
116. Willot v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 79 (1856).
117. Id. at 80-82.
118. Reichart v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160 (1868).
119. See LEE EPSTEIN T AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND
DEVELOPMENTS 96-99 (1994) (including Reichart in a table of Supreme Court decisions: "Holding
Acts of Congress Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part, 1789-1990").
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nullify titles confirmed many years before by the authorized agents of
the government."'2 Congress had done no such thing. The law struck
down in Reichart contained a savings clause declaring that "nothing
herein contained, shall be construed to confirm any particular decision, heretofore made in favour of any individual, or to affect the right
of any other individual claiming the same land; but such conflicting
claims shall be decided according to law by the proper tribunal."'' As
a result, the board of revision had no power to nullify private titles.
As was the case with the Taney Court cases discussed above, the federal statute in question only authorized granting the federal interest
in certain land.
Reichart was decided on constitutional grounds. Chief Justice
Salmon Chase held that Congress could not constitutionally nullify
Still,
private land titles and did not mention the savings clause.'
numerous antebellum cases had also held that Congress could not
constitutionally nullify private land titles, similarly ignoring statutory
language indicating that Congress had not intended to nullify land
titles. Either Reichart should be taken off the list of cases declaring
federal laws unconstitutional or other Supreme Court cases should be
added. Better yet, these cases should all be understood as instances
where the justices laid down clear constitutional limitations on federal
power without necessarily declaring a federal law unconstitutional.
The constitutional ban on naked land transfers also justified
principles of statutory interpretation that required justices to ignore
the plain meaning of legislative or executive decrees in order to preAs noted above, the antebellum
vent constitutional violations.
presumption that governing offian
absolute
Supreme Court adopted
cials had not intended to grant to B land that belonged to A, even
when the relevant text seemed to sanction that outcome."' The justices in Lytle for similar reasons interpreted a statutory provision
authorizing a town to select from all the land within a given region as
merely authorizing the town to select from all the unappropriated
land within the region.'" Given that the unanimous Supreme Court in
Fletcher and Rice insisted that state and federal land grants that did
impair vested rights would be unconstitutional, sharp distinctions
should not be made between decisions holding that governing officials
could not constitutionally grant private property and decisions holding

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Reichart,73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 166-67.
Act of Feb. 20, 1812, ch. 22, § 3, 2 Stat. 677, 678 (1812).
See Reichart, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 166.
See supranotes 96-100, 111-17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lytle v. Arkansas, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 314, 334 (1850).
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that for constitutional reasons the statute in question would not be
interpreted as authorizing governing officials to grant private
property.
Percheman' provides another instance where, instead of ignoring statutory law, the justices engaged in statutory misconstruction solely to prevent an unconstitutional naked land transfer of property. The issue in Perchemanwas not whether federal authorities had
granted land to one person that was owned by a third party-the
statute in question explicitly denied that intention'2 -- rather the issue
was how ownership was to be determined. Congress had provided a
commission to ascertain land titles in Florida. "Any claim not filed"
before a specific date, the crucial provision of the relevant statute
declared, "shall be deemed and held to be void and of none effect."'' 7
Percheman filed no claim before the commission." He nevertheless
insisted that he retained title to the disputed land because of a land
grant from Spain when Florida was acknowledged Spanish territory.
The Marshall Court found in favor of Percheman, interpreting
the statutory provision in dispute as merely prohibiting the commission from confirming land claims filed after the given date. 'The provision, that claims not filed with the commissioners previous to the
30th of June 1823 should be void," Marshall's opinion stated, "can
mean only that they should be held so by the commissioners, and not
allowed by them."'
Marshall's remarkable analysis denied that the
statute affected underlying property rights. In his view, the power of
the commission "should not extend to claims filed afterwards" only because "[i]t is impossible to suppose that Congress intended to forfeit
real titles not exhibited to their commissioners within so short a period."" Marshall made clear that the fundamental problem with a
literal interpretation of the statute was the power to divest title, and
not the short period of time to file claims. 'Is it possible," he asked,
"that Congress could design to submit the validity of titles, which were
'valid under the Spanish government, or by the law of nations,' to the
determination of these commissioners?""'3 For this reason, Marshall
concluded, "the mind of Congress was directed solely to the

125. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
126. See Act of May 8, 1822, ch. 129, § 5, 3 Stat. 709, 718 (1822) ("[S]uch confirmation will
only act as a release of any interest which the United States may have.').
127. Id. § 4, 3 Stat. at 717.
128. For the background of the Percheman litigation as discussed in this paragraph, see
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 51-82.
129. Id. at 90.

130. Id.
131. Id. at 91.
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confirmation of claims, not to their annulment.' 3. Persons would not
lose any property right to land in Florida merely because they ignored
the procedures laid down by the federal government for ascertaining
land titles.
The difficulty with Marshall's position is that the commission
was statutorily charged with "ascertaining and determining... all
claims to land within [Florida].""' The statute declared, "every person... claiming title to lands.., valid under the Spanish government ...shall file, before the commissioners, his, her, or their
claim.""'3
The same provision concluded that "any claim not
filed... shall be held to be void. ' 35 This use of "void" seems a poor
way to state that the commissioners could not consider such a claim,
but courts could. Marshall's interpretation seems particularly perverse because the commissioners were obligated to post notices "re'
quiring all persons to bring forward their claims."36
Such language
hardly bespeaks a legislative intent that persons who ignored the
commission would nevertheless be able to assert title to Florida land
in judicial proceedings. In short, the evidence strongly suggests that
Marshall avoided declaring a law an unconstitutional naked land
transfer in Percheman only by deliberately misreading the text of the
statute.
This judicial willingness to reject the plain meaning of a legislative decree, for the sole reason that such an interpretation would
require the justices to void the offending measure, superficially resembles a "passive virtue" that Bickel urged federal justices to employ
as a means for obviating the need to take positions on constitutional
matters. 1 "
The Least Dangerous Branch championed Justice
Brandeis's suggestion.. in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority
that by resolving cases on statutory grounds, the Supreme Court could
"avoid[ ] passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions
pressed upon it for decision.' 39 Antebellum justices, however, aggressively resolved those constitutional questions Bickel and Brandeis
sought to avoid. Judicial opinions made clear that the statute was not
being interpreted consistent with its literal meaning because the fed-

132. Id. at 94.
133. See Act of May 8, 1822, ch. 129, § 4, 3 Stat. 709, 717 (1822) (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. § 3.
137. Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40 (1961).
138. BICKEL, supranote 18, at 175-83.
139. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
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eral government had no power to pass such a measure.'
Whereas
Bickel and Brandeis sought to keep constitutional questions open,
antebellum justices interpreted federal law in ways that foreclosed
consideration of those constitutional questions. The Court held that
the statute at issue in Percheman could not be interpreted as authorizing the commission to void titles not presented at a certain time,
because the federal government had no constitutional authority to
pass such a law.
The Supreme Court in one sense could never declare laws unconstitutional if every federal statute had a provision indicating that
nothing in the law was intended to exercise powers not entrusted to
the national government or violate constitutional rights. Similarly,
the justices would never have to void a legislative decree if they
always adopted an irrebuttable presumption that the statute before
the Court was not intended to exercise unconstitutional powers or
abridge constitutional liberties. Questions of judicial review in a
democracy would hardly vanish, however, if savings clauses were
routinely placed in all statutes or if statutes were routinely misconstrued rather than declared unconstitutional. Dred Scott would be no
less controversial had Congress included in the Missouri Compromise
a savings clause declaring, "nothing in this statute is intended to
abridge any constitutional right," or if the justices for constitutional
reasons declared that they would never interpret a federal law as
prohibiting slavery in the territories.
The better approach is to acknowledge that judicial review is
not necessarily countermajoritarian.
Following Willot v. Sandford,
some cases may hold that Congress is not constitutionally authorized
to do what Congress by statute recognized the national legislature
could not constitutionally do. The savings clauses in most antebellum
land laws licensed the justices to enforce the consensual constitutional
understanding that government could not grant private property.
That the Supreme Court had legislative permission to void those land
grants under certain conditions is consistent with the Court voiding
those land grants on constitutional grounds. Moreover, as Lytle and
Percheman indicate, the justices with tacit legislative approval understood this delegation of power as licensing the federal courts to misconstrue minor statutes that, if followed to the letter, would result in
an unconstitutional naked land transfer. All these cases clearly imposed constitutional limits on federal power. Whether they also de-

140. See, e.g., Commonwealth of Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860); Lytle v.
Arkansas, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 314 (1850); United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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clared a law unconstitutional should be recognized as a question of
less significance.
C. Equal Footing
Supreme Court decisions in cases raising questions concerning
the "equal footing" doctrine present more complex judicial applications
of the constitutional ban on naked land transfers. The litigants in the
federal land law cases discussed above agreed that the United States
could have granted the land in dispute if that land had not previously
been granted. The point of contention was over the facts or procedures
necessary to determine whether that land had previously been
granted. The dispute in equal footing cases was over whether the
United States had the power to grant the land in dispute, even if that
land had not previously been granted. Equal footing cases raised
naked land transfer questions because the underlying claim was that
federal officials had granted, or were asserting authority to grant,
land that by constitutional law no longer belonged to the national
government.
Antebellum Americans agreed that new states would be created equal. The Northwest Ordinance declared that new states were
entitled "to a share in the federal councils on an equal footing with the
original states.'.' Congressional resolutions similarly proclaimed that
new states were "admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the
original states, in all respects whatever.' ' . What "equal footing"
meant in practice, however, was never clear. Events during the
constitutional convention established that new states would be
allocated representation in Congress and electoral votes on the same
4
basis as the original states."
No agreement was reached on whether
the national government could pass laws attaching conditions for
statehood that would be unconstitutional if applied to an existing
state. Much of the debate during the Missouri crisis was over whether
Congress could require a territory to free slaves as a condition for

141. THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE (1787), reprinted in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

130 (Henry Steele Commanger ed., 8th ed. 1968).
142. Act of Apr. 8,1812, ch. 50, § 1, 2 Stat. 701, 703 (1812) (declaring admission of
Louisiana); see also Act of Dec. 14, 1819, Res. I, 3 Stat. 608, 609 (1819) (declaring admission of
Alabama).
143. See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 2 (Max Ferrand ed.,
1937).
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statehood, even though all prominent political actors agreed that
Congress had no power to interfere with slavery in an existing state."
Public land policy proved a particularly thorny political application for the "equal footing" doctrine. The original states at the time
of ratification owned all lands within their jurisdiction that had not
previously been granted to private parties. 45' The national government, all agreed, could exercise exclusive jurisdiction over land within
a given state only under the stringent conditions set out in the Constitution itself: in "Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of
the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.'4.. Territories were a different matter. In these regions, there was a general
consensus that the federal government had the right to govern and
dispose of all land not previously granted to third parties. Some influential westerners, most notably future Justice John McKinley, maintained that when a territory became a state, equal footing principles
required that title to all unappropriated land instantly become vested
in the new state.' 7 The Indiana legislature in 1829 declared, "this
State, being a sovereign, free, and independent State, has the exclusive right to the soil and eminent domain of all the unappropriated
lands within her acknowledged boundaries."'4 8 This state's rights
position was never recognized by the national government, "9 and was
largely abandoned by the early 1830s." Most politicians during the
Jacksonian era maintained that ownership rights over unappropriated
land did not transfer from the national government to states upon
statehood. New states were routinely required to "disclaim all right or
title to the waste or unappropriated lands, lying within [their] territory..' 5' Nevertheless, several peripheral matters concerning the

144. See GLOVER MOORE, THE MISSOURI CONTROVERSY, 1819-1821, at 42-46, 120-22 (1967);
see also DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 25-26 (1984).
145. See FELLER, supranote 144, at 5.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
147. FELLER, supranote 144, at 37, 43-44, 48, 74-78, 86, 94-95, 107-08, 115 (discussing other
states' views on appropriating public lands within their domain); JOHN MCKINLEY, SPEECH OF
MR. MCKINLEY, OF ALABAMA ON THE BILL TO GRADUATE THE PRICE OF PUBLIC LANDS (Mar. 26,
1828) (Washington, Green & Jarvis "1828). Justice Baldwin also seems to have held this view.
See BALDWIN, supranote 81, at 95 ('Tihe United States can have no right of soil within any of
the states of this Union, unless by a cession from the particular states, or a foreign state, who
was the original, absolute, proprietary thereof.!).
148. FELLER, supranote 144, at 108.
149. See NORTHWEST ORDINANCE, supra note 141, at 131 ('The legislatures of those districts
or new States, shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States.!).
150. See FELLER, supra note 144, at 108-09, 134.
151. Act of Feb. 20, 1811, ch. 21, 2 Stat. 641, 642 (1811); see also Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 47, 3
Stat. 489, 492 (1819).
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transfer of jurisdiction over land at statehood did come before the
antebellum federal judiciary. The Taney Court in these cases relied
on equal footing principles when placing constitutional limits on federal power.
The Supreme Court first proved willing to limit federal control
of land in new states when handing down an important decision the
year after Marshall died. The issue in Mayor of New Orleans v.
United States was whether the local authorities or the national government was authorized to grant title to property that had been dedicated for public purposes when Louisiana was a territory.52 Federal
authorities had long presumed that such land remained under the
exclusive control of the national government. After Louisiana became
a state, Congress passed at least three statutes exercising control over
particular parcels of the disputed area." When New Orleans sought
to sell another part of the land in question, the local federal attorney
went to court seeking an injunction barring the sale."'
A unanimous Supreme Court sided with the city against the
federal government. Justice McLean's opinion recognized that Congress had previously asserted control over the land." He nevertheless
insisted that such control was inconsistent with the constitutional allocation of authority over property. The federal government, McLean
claimed, could exercise exclusive jurisdiction only over land that was
being used for the narrow purposes set in Article I, Section 8. His
opinion declared:
Special provision is made in the constitution, for the cession of jurisdiction from the
states over places where the federal government shall establish forts, or other military
works. And it is only in these places, or in the territories of the United States, where it
can exercise a general jurisdiction. 15 6

As the federal government conceded that the land in question was not
being used for any specified Article I purpose, New Orleans concluded
that the Constitution vested sovereignty over land dedicated for special purposes in states immediately upon statehood."7
New Orleans was clearly a constitutional decision. In sharp
contrast to the naked land transfer cases discussed previously, Justice
McLean could not have relied on a statutory ground for his decision.

152. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States (New Orleans), 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 711 (1836).
153. Act of Mar. 30, 1822, ch. 16, 3 Stat. 661 (1822); Act of Apr. 20, 1818, ch. 115, 3 Stat. 465
(1818); Act of Apr. 3, 1812, ch. 48, 2 Stat. 700 (1812).
154. See New Orleans, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 663.
155. Id. at 734-35.
156. Id. at 737.
157. Id.
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None of the three statutes under consideration had a savings clause
preserving the rights of third parties. New Orleans held that local
authorities had title to the land in question despite clear statutory
assertion of federal control. 'The state of Louisiana was admitted into
the union," McLean wrote, "on the same footing as the original
states.""' In his view, Louisiana's "rights of sovereignty are the same,
and by consequence no jurisdiction of the federal government, either
for purposes of police or otherwise, can be exercised over this public
ground, which is not common to the United States.' '5 9 No federal injunction could prevent the city of New Orleans from granting private
parties title to the disputed land. Previous sales or leases of that
property were deemed unconstitutional naked land transfers.'
"It
belongs to the local authority to enforce the trust," McLean asserted,
"and prevent what they shall deem a violation of it by the city authorities.'.'..
Later nineteenth-century cases treated New Orleans as
authoritatively holding that, while the federal government could own
lands in state, state law governed all land within the borders of a state
except federal land being used for Article I purposes.'62
New Orleans did not declare a federal law unconstitutional
only because while past federal laws had assumed federal control over
the land in controversy, no federal law explicitly banned the sale of
the particular parcel of land at issue in the case. Although New
Orleans's effort to sell the parcel was inconsistent with existing federal practice, the action did not directly impair any rights granted by
previous federal laws. No beneficiary of any previous federal statute
was a party to the New Orleans litigation. Hence, the constitutionality of those measures which asserting federal authority over the
disputed property, strictly speaking, was not before the Court.
Still, when concluding that New Orleans could sell the disputed
parcel, Justice McLean's opinion made clear that the national government had no power to pass the previous acts that counsel for the
United States had claimed demonstrated federal control of the land in
question.'" Certainly third parties who had acquired rights by those
previous federal acts could have no confidence that those rights would
stand up when challenged by a party who had been granted a similar
right by New Orleans. What confidence that might have been mus-

158. Id.

159. Id.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 731.
Id. at 737.
See, e.g., Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223-24 (1845).
See New Orleans, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) at 735-36.
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tered was surely abandoned nine years later when the Supreme Court
clearly voided another federal land grant on equal footing grounds.
That case, Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, concerned the constitutionality of a private federal law transferring title to land below the
high water mark of the Mobile River." Most Jacksonian leaders, as
noted above," agreed that when territories became states, the federal
government retained title (though not jurisdiction) over unappropriated and waste lands. Consistent with this belief, the national government continued selling and giving away public lands after a territory became a state. One such grant was made to the heirs of William
Pollard."
Alabama and other states maintained that when they
joined the Union, their state at the very least acquired title to all
rivers and riverbeds, and that such lands belonged to the states to
dispose of, subject only to the requirement that state policies not obstruct interstate commerce. 67 The defendant in Pollard'sLessee, John
Hagan, claimed title by virtue of a grant from Alabama to the shore
lands that the national government had granted to Pollard's heirs."
The Alabama Supreme Court in a series of decisions had previously endorsed Alabama's understanding of equal footing. Alabama
grantees were ruled the proper owner of riverbeds in that state. The
federal land grant to the heirs of William Pollard and related federal
laws were declared "inoperative.' 69 Judge Collier of the Alabama
Supreme Court in City of Mobile v. Eslava held that "it is not competent for Congress to grant a right of property" in state riverbeds.'
Why Congress lacked this power was not entirely clear in the original
opinion and was further muddied in subsequent Alabama decisions.
Judge Collier, in a related case handed down the next year, declared
that Eslava "decided... that Congress did not possess the constitutional right to grant the shore of the navigable waters within the
States.'.'
Two years later, however, Judge Collier claimed that
Eslava merely held that because, properly interpreted, the congressional act recognizing Alabama statehood left that state in possession
of state riverbeds, the constitutional wrong in Eslava was merely the
federal grant of land previously granted to the state of Alabama-a
M

164. For a good description of the background of that case, see ROBERT SAUNDERS JR., JOHN
ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL: SOUTHERN MODERATE, 1811-1889, at 43-56 (1997).
165. See supranotes 147-51 and accompanying text.
166. See Act of July 2, 1836, ch. 344, 6 Stat. 680 (1836).
167. See Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 214-16 (argument of Mr. Sergeant).
168. See id. at 214 (argument of Mr. Coxe).
169. See City of Mobile v. Eslava, 9 Port. 577, 603 (Ala. 1839).
170. Id. at 603.
171. Doe ex dem. Duval's Heirs v. McLoskey, 1 Ala. 708, 747 (1840).
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naked land transfer. Eslava, he now declared, did not explore
"[w]hether an admission of a State into the Union, on the same footing
as the original States, means any thing more than an equal participation in political rights and privileges."'72 To further confuse matters,
the original Eslava opinion, without acknowledging the existence of
the savings clause in the original land grant, asserted that the "act of
Congress cannot be held to assert a title on the part of the United
States, but is nothing more than a renunciation of whatever title the
government may have."'" 3 These ambiguous passages suggest that the
Alabama decisions on ownership of riverbeds can be interpreted as
merely declaring that by statute Congress had not divested any state
title, or as holding that Congress lacked the constitutional power to
divest any state title.
After ducking the issue in several cases on procedural or other
statutory grounds," the United States Supreme Court in 1845 more
clearly asserted the constitutional grounds for ruling that the Alabama grantees were the legitimate owners of the disputed property.
Justice McKinley's majority opinion did everything necessary to declare a federal law unconstitutional but explicitly utter the sentence
"the federal law is unconstitutional.' 75 His opinion focused almost
entirely on the constitutional status of lands below the high water
mark. His crucial conclusions were constitutional conclusions, highlighting the lack of federal power, not a mere statutory failure to exercise constitutional powers in a particular circumstance. McKinley
asserted that "to Alabama belong the navigable waters and soils under
them." 6 'This right of eminent domain over the shores and soils
under the navigable waters," he continued, "belongs exclusively to the
states and they, and only they, have the constitutional power to
exercise it.".7 McKinley rejected claims that the provision in the law
providing for Alabama statehood reserving all unappropriated and
waste lands to the national government 8 supported the Pollard claim.

172. Kemp ex dem. Pollard's Heirs v. Thorp, 3 Ala. 291, 293-94 (1842).
173. Eslava,9 Port. at 596-97.
174. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Eslava, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 234, 245-46 (1842) (stating that the
constitutional issue was not properly raised in the record); City of Mobile v. Hallett, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 261, 263 (1842) (holding that federal grantee had no statutory right against a private party
because land fit within exception to the Act); accord City of Mobile v. Emanuel, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
95, 100 (1843); see also SAUNDERS, supra note 164, at 51 (pointing out that the Court kept
dodging the underlying question).
175. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 229 (1845).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 229-30. McKinley did maintain that the compact between Alabama and the
United States was not intended to vest rights to riverbeds in the federal government.
178. See Act of Mar. 2, 1819, ch. 47, 3 Stat. 489, 492 (1819).
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"No compact," in his view, "that might be made between [Alabama]
and the United States could diminish or enlarge these rights" to state
rivers and riverbeds." McKinley, in sharp contrast to Judge Collier of
Alabama, did not consider whether Congress had ceded control of the
disputed property in the law providing for Alabama statehood.
Moreover, he never mentioned the existence of a savings clause in the
federal grant to Pollard's heirs. Instead, McKinley concluded by laying down three constitutional limitations on federal power:
First, The shores of navigable waters and the soils under them, were not granted by
the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively.
Secondly, The new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction over this
subject as the original states. Thirdly, The right of the United States to the public
lands, and the power of Congress to make all needful rules and regulations for the sale
and disposition thereof, conferred no power to grant to the plaintiffs the land in
controversy in this case. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the state of Alabama
is, therefore, affirmed.18 °

The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the principles of
Pollard's Lessee in two subsequent cases. Hallett v. Beebe.8 summarily declared on the authority of Pollard'sLessee that the national
government could not give good title to land below the high water
mark of a river. The brief opinion in Beebe noted the existence of a
savings clause in the statute in question. That clause, however,
played no role in the decision. 8 ' As the reporter's headnote declared,
the holding in Beebe was "after the admission of Alabama into the
Union as a State, Congress could make no grant of land situated between the high and low water marks."'"
The justices in Goodtitle
ruled that while the national government could grant land below the
high water mark when governing territories, states only had to honor
federal grants when the title had been perfected before statehood.""
The existence of an imperfect title, Chief Justice Taney declared,
"could not enlarge the power of the United States over the place in
question... nor authorize the general government to grant or confirm

179. Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229.
180. Id. at 230.
181. Hallett v. Beebe (Beebe), 54 U.S. (13 How.) 25 (1851), affg sub nom. Doe ex dem.
Kennedy v. Beebe, 8 Ala. 909 (1846).
182. Id. at 26. No justice in Pollard'sLessee or Goodtitle ex dem. Pollardv. Kibbe, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 471 (1850), mentioned the existence of a similar savings clause. See Act of July 2, 1836,
ch. 344, 6 Stat. 680, 681 (1836). But see Mobile Transp. Co. v. City of Mobile, 187 U.S. 479, 490
(1903) (citing the savings clause as supporting the ruling that "inasmuch as all lands below the
high water mark had passed to the State of Alabama upon her admission into the Union in 1819,
there was nothing left upon which a subsequent patent of the United States could operate").
183. Beebe, 54 U.S. (13 How.) at 25.
184. Goodtitle, 50 U.S. (9 How.) at 478.
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a title to land when the sovereignty and dominion over it had become
vested in the State."'
Whether Pollard's Lessee declared a federal law unconstitutional is not perfectly clear, given the confused grounds for the original state court decisions. Still, Justice Catron's dissent in Pollard's
Lessee recognized that the Supreme Court had declared federal laws
unconstitutional. "The act," he wrote, "is declared void in the present
cause."'"
Catron further observed, "[t]he charge of the state court to
the jury was, that the act of Congress of 1836,... [and] the act of
1824, were void.... And this charge is declared to have been proper,
by a majority of this court."'8 President Polk may have been referring
to Pollard's Lessee when he reminded Americans in 1848 that "[t]he
Supreme Court of the United States is invested with the power to
declare, and has declared, acts of Congress ... to be unconstitutional
and void."'"M The reference to "acts of Congress" declared "unconstitutional and void" suggests that Polk and his audience believed the federal judiciary had struck down more than one federal law. For both
grammatical and other reasons, the possibility cannot be ruled out
that Polk was referring only to Marbury or only to Marbury and
United States v. Yale Todd, an extraordinarily obscure case whose
existence was not even reported until 1852."' Still, given that President Polk was attempting to justify the frequent use of the veto power
by Jacksonian executives to prevent measures believed unconstitutional from becoming law, good reason exists that he was not just
referring to two judicial decisions on trivial federal jurisdiction measures decided more than forty-five years in the past. Rather, the President may well have had in mind Pollard's Lessee, a decision handed
down during his presidency, and perhaps some of the other cases
discussed previously where the Supreme Court declared federal land
grants void.
The Pollard'sLessee"9 and New Orleans.9' decisions belie recent
claims that antebellum justices held narrow understandings of the judicial power in constitutional cases, and that the jurists on the Mar-

185. Id.
186. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 233 (1845) (Catron, J., dissenting).
187. Id.
188. James K. Polk, FourthAnnual Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at
2479, 2518.
189. United States v. Yale Todd was decided in 1794, but was never printed as there was not
an official reporter at that time. It appears, however, in United States v. Ferreira,54 U.S. (13
How.) 40, 52-53 (1852). See 6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 52 n.85 (Paul Freund ed., 1971).

190. Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 233.
191. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States (New Orleans), 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836).
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shall and Taney Courts believed the judicial power in constitutional
cases was restricted to questions of a judiciary nature192 or should be
exercised only when a federal law was unconstitutional beyond a
reasonable doubt.193 The issue in Pollard's Lessee and New Orleans
concerned land law, not judicial procedure or federal jurisdiction. No
justice or counsel in those cases, in any related case, or, for that matter, in any Taney Court case, asserted that the judicial power did not
extend to disputes between the national and state governments concerning authority over land. Justice Catron's dissent in Pollard's
Lessee suggests that the rule of reasonable doubt was more rhetoric
than a principle that actually influenced judicial decisions. Catron's
opinion in many ways reads like the dissents in Roe v. Wade... or
National League of Cities v. Usery"' in its accusation that new constitutional rights were being invented. The justice from Tennessee paid
particular attention to a long legal history supporting the federal
ownership of the riverbeds. "For thirty years," he complained, "neither Congress, [n]or any state legislature, has called into question the
power of the United States to grant the flowed land."'96 In his view, "in
such a case, where there is a doubt, and a conflict suggested, the
political departments, state and federal should settle the matter by
legislation.' '97 No justice in the majority responded to Catron's effort
to employ the principle of reasonable doubt.
III. THE ROUTINIZING OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
The naked land transfer cases belie the near universal claim
that the Supreme Court did not declare a federal law unconstitutional
between Marbury and Dred Scott. The Taney Court in the Pollard's
Lessee line of cases clearly struck down a series of federal statutes.
New Orleans might also count as an instance where the Supreme
Court declared federal laws unconstitutional. When concluding that
New Orleans could sell the disputed parcel, Justice McLean's unani-

192. See generally ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1989); MATTHEW J. FRANCK, AGAINST THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY: THE SUPREME COURT VS. THE
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE (1996).

193. See generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1990); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW (rev. ed. 1994).

194.
195.
196.
197.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
Pollard'sLessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 232 (Catron, J., dissenting).
Id. (Catron, J., dissenting).
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mous opinion made clear that three federal laws asserting federal
sovereignty over that land were unconstitutional. No third person, he
made clear, could acquire any right to that property by virtue of those
federal statutes. '
The naked land transfer cases also demonstrate that judicial
review of federal law, understood as the judicial power to impose constitutional limits on federal action, was relatively common practice
before the Civil War. The justices may have rarely declared federal
laws unconstitutional. Still, the justices relied heavily on a variety of
other means for preventing Congress from transgressing constitutional limits. Antebellum justices engaged in statutory misconstruction when interpreting a statute literally would result in a naked land
transfer. In other cases, Marshall and Taney Court majorities engaged in statutory neglect, declaring that the federal government
could not constitutionally grant land without determining whether the
federal government by statute had attempted to grant that land. Significantly, the naked land transfer cases were not the only instances
where the Supreme Court before the Civil War used statutory misconstruction and neglect to impose constitutional limitations on federal
power. Close reading of other antebellum cases reveals a Supreme
Court far more willing to restrict federal power than conventional accounts suggest.
The first sixty-five volumes of the U.S. Reports contain many
examples of statutory misconstruction.
Chief Justice Taney in
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison19 9 avoided declaring a federal
law unconstitutional by refusing to adopt the plain meaning of a
statutory declaration. Although nothing in the language or context of
the statute suggested that Congress was engaged in mere exhortation
when adopting that provision, the unanimous Court nevertheless
ruled that the statutory declaration, "it shall be the duty" of a state
executive to extradite a fugitive from another state, stated a judicially
unenforceable moral responsibility rather than an enforceable legal
obligation.' Taney admitted that "[t]he words, 'it shall be the duty,'
in ordinary legislation, imply the assertion of the power to command
and to coerce obedience."'"' He rejected that interpretation only because "the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power
to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel

198. See Mayor of New Orleans v. United States (New Orleans), 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 735-36

(1836).
199. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
200. Id. at 107.
201. Id.
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him to perform it.""° The Marshall and Ellsworth Courts in at least
three cases interpreted the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789
granting federal jurisdiction in all cases "where an alien is a party,"'
as granting jurisdiction only when "an alien is one party, but a citizen
is the other.""° Statutes, the justices explained, "must receive a construction, consistent with the constitution."'
Antebellum justices sometimes conflated statutory and constitutional analysis by first interpreting legislation as intended only to
exercise constitutional powers and then holding that the Constitution
did not vest the national government with the power to regulate the
activity in question. People's Ferry Co. of Boston v. Beers held that
federal courts could not exercise admiralty jurisdiction in disputes
over the wages due to a shipbuilder.' No specific statutory analysis
was necessary because the justices, without argument or evidence, assumed that federal admiralty statutes only vested federal courts with
jurisdiction in cases where the Constitution (as interpreted by the
Supreme Court) permitted jurisdiction, and that the Constitution did
not authorize admiralty jurisdiction for disputes over a "contract made
on land, to be performed on land.""°'
Taney Court justices demonstrated their capacity to engage in
statutory neglect when adjudicating a series of cases concerning the
transfer of federal judicial power after territories became a state.m
The Supreme Court in Benner v. Porterheld that when reestablishing
federal jurisdiction, Congress could not authorize former territorial
courts and judges to continue functioning.'
Federal jurisdiction in
new states, the justices agreed, could be exercised only by newly established federal tribunals that met all Article III standards. Any

202. Id. at 107-08. For other Taney Court decisions construing and misconstruing statutes to
avoid declaring federal laws unconstitutional, see Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92
(1858); Veazie v. Mobr, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568, 575 (1853).
203. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 10, 1 Stat. 72, 78 (1789).
204. Mossman v. Higginson, 4 U.S. (4 DalU.) 12, 14 (1800); see also Jackson v. Twentyman, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 136, 136 (1829); Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304
(1809). For a similar Marshall Court exercise in statutory misconstruction, see generally Owings
v. Norwood's Lessee, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 344 (1809) (noting that the 25th section of the Judiciary
Act must be limited by the Constitution); see also generally Dennis J. Mahoney, A Historical
Note on Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 725, 730 (1982) (discussing the influence of
this practice on Marshall Court decisionmaking).
205. Mossman, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 14.
206. People's Ferry Co. v. Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393, 401 (1858).
207. Id. at 402. For a similar exercise in statutory/constitutional analysis, see Ex Parte
Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (3 Black) 243, 251 (1864).
208. For other examples of statutory neglect, see Exparte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (3 Black) at
251.
209. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 245 (1850).
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action taken after statehood by an Article I territorial court or judge
was null, even if that action was authorized by federal law. "Congress," Justice Nelson wrote,
must not only ordain and establish inferior courts within a State, and prescribe their
jurisdiction, but the judges appointed to administer them must posses the
constitutional tenure of office before they can become invested with any portion of the
judicial power of the Union. There is no exception to this rule in the Constitution. The
Territorial courts, therefore, were not courts in which the judicial power conferred by
the Constitution on the Federal government could be deposited. They were incapable
of receiving it, as the tenure of the incumbents was but for four years.... Neither were
they organized by Congress under the Constitution, as they were invested with powers
and jurisdiction which that body were incapable of conferring upon a court within the
21 0
limits of a State.

Benner explicitly declared that Congress could not constitutionally vest an Article I court with Article III powers, and that the
decision of the territorial judge after statehood in the case before the
court was utterly void. The opinion does not, however, indicate
whether Congress actually authorized a territorial court of justice to
exercise federal judicial power in a state. Losing counsel pointed to
several statutes that he claimed permitted territorial courts to continue functioning to some degree until Article III federal courts were
established in a new state. Justice Nelson did not discuss this statutory matter. Having reached the constitutional conclusion that territorial courts could not adjudicate cases once a territory became a
state, Justice Nelson apparently did not find it necessary to discuss
whether Congress had attempted to continue jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Taney in 1846 similarly used a constitutional issue to avoid a statutory question. The issue in Hunt v. Palao was
whether and how the justices could obtain the record of the territorial
proceedings for a case then pending before the Supreme Court of the
United States. "' Taney first noted that the original writ of error from
the territorial court was now void and could not support jurisdiction:
"[t]he court which rendered the judgment in the case before us is no
longer in existence. 2.. Taney then noted that counsel had claimed
that the Judiciary Act of 1789 might enable the justices to obtain the
materials necessary to hear the case. Rather than explore whether
federal statutory law justified jurisdiction, Taney indicated that statutory language was not relevant. In his view, even "if the language of
that section would justify such a construction, and the record and proceedings were brought here by a writ of error..., still there is no

210. Id. at 244.
211. Hunt v. Palao, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 589, 590 (1846).
212. Id.
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tribunal to which we are authorized to send a mandate to proceed further in the case, or to carry into execution the judgment which this
court may pronounce."213 Just as Justice Nelson had done in Benner,
Chief Justice Taney did not determine whether federal statutes provided for jurisdiction because jurisdiction could not be constitutionally
given.
McNulty v. Batty... deserves special mention as the most creative antebellum judicial effort to articulate constitutional limits on
federal power without explicitly declaring a federal law unconstitutional. The issue in McNulty was whether the Supreme Court could
hear a case on a writ of error from a territorial court after the territory
had become a state. Following Benner and Hunt, the justices first
determined that federal courts could not constitutionally adjudicate
cases on a writ of error from a territorial court that no longer existed."5 Justice Nelson's unanimous opinion recognized, however, that
Congress had by law established a procedure for appealing territorial
decisions to the federal judiciary. That federal law gave the Supreme
Court jurisdiction over "all cases which may be pending in the
Supreme or other Superior Court of and for any Territory of the
United States" as well as "all cases in which judgments or decrees
shall have been rendered in such Supreme or Superior Court at the
time of such admission, and not previously removed by [a] writ of
error or appeal." '16 Alas, the losing party in McNulty had removed
that case to the Supreme Court by a writ of error before Wisconsin
joined the Union. Justice Nelson recognized that the phrase "'not
previously removed by a writ of error or appeal'... was drawn,
doubtless, under the supposition that.., no legislation was necessary
to preserve or give effect to the jurisdiction of the court' in cases that
had been removed to the Supreme Court before statehood."' Congress
had no reason for allowing appeals taken immediately after but not
immediately before a territory became a state. Nevertheless, Nelson
concluded that this federal legislative "opinion" was "founded in
error." 8 Repeating the holding of Benner, Nelson asserted:
this court can exercise no appellate power over cases, unless conferred upon it by act of
Congress, if the act conferring the jurisdiction has expired, the jurisdiction ceases,

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
McNulty v. Batty, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 72 (1851).
See id. at 78.
Id. at79 (quoting Act of Feb. 22, 1848, ch. 12, 9 Stat. 211 (1848)).

217. Id. at 80.
218. Id.
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or writ of error be actually pending in the court at the time of the
although the appeal 219
expiration of the act.

Thus, even though Congress passed a statute clearly indicating a legislative belief that the justices could reach the merits of such cases as
McNulty without additional jurisdictional support, the justices insisted that McNulty could not be resolved unless federal law explicitly
authorized jurisdiction.
Justice Nelson then announced that the Court would not resolve McNulty even if Congress corrected this constitutional mistake.
McNulty could not be adjudicated by an Article III court because the
case neither raised an issue of federal law nor met the constitutional
standards for federal diversity jurisdiction. "Should the judgment be
affirmed or reversed," Justice Nelson concluded, federal courts "possessed no power to carry the mandate into execution, the case not
being one of Federal Jurisdiction."' ° In short, McNulty avoids declaring a federal law unconstitutional only because the justices concluded
that Congress, not understanding the constitutional requirements for
providing for appeals from defunct territorial courts to the Supreme
Court of the United States, made a constitutional mistake and failed
to provide for jurisdiction over a particular class of cases. Had the
federal statute been drafted correctly, the statute would have been
unconstitutional.
Scholars who claim that the contemporary practice of judicial
review dates only from Reconstruction71 should reconsider this claim
in light of the naked land cases, cases associated with the transfer of
judicial power upon statehood, and other cases where antebellum justices imposed constitutional limitations on federal power. When
resolving constitutional challenges to federal laws, Marshall and
Taney Court justices did not adopt any of the narrow understandings
of judicial review frequently attributed to them.' Supreme Court justices before the Civil War laid down constitutional restraints on federal power in cases that did not concern federal jurisdiction or judicial

219. Id. at 79.
220. Id. at 79-80.
221. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO
POLITICS 97 (1996); STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS 125
(1968); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING
AMERICAN JUDGES 86 (expanded ed. 1988); William E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial
Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
1166, 1168-69 (1972).
222. For claims that the justices adopted narrow understandings of judicial power, see supra
notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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procedure:' they laid down constitutional restraints when proposed
federal actions had a rational constitutional basis, ' and they insisted
in the naked land transfer cases that the federal government had to
respect certain fundamental rights that were not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
Antebellum justices seemed no more restrained than contemporary justices when adjudicating those issues of federal power that
reached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not strike down
any major piece of federal legislation before 1857, but that tribunal,
after McCulloch v. Maryland' in 1819, also did not sustain any major
piece of federal legislation.' The main reason for this abstinence was
less a theory of judicial restraint than Jacksonian politics. During the
four decades before the Civil War, virtually all controversial constitutional proposals that were not vetted by the national legislature were
vetoed by the national executive.'l The main difference between the
exercise of judicial review before and after the Civil War is that Marshall and Taney Court justices preferred imposing constitutional
limits on federal power through statutory misconstruction and neglect

223. In addition to the land cases set out in Part II, see Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
84 (1858) and Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 568 (1853).
224. New Orleans, Pollard'sLessee, and Vallandigham seem particularly good examples of
decisions limiting a federal power that seemed to have some rational constitutional basis.
225. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
226. The most important federal policies sustained by the Taney Court were the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1793, the Admiralty Act of 1843, and the congressional decision in 1832 to give
states funds to repair the national road. See The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
443, 458 (1851); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 165 (1845); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842).
227. For vetoes by Jacksonian executives preventing constitutionally controversial exercises
of federal power from becoming law, see James Buchanan, Veto Messages, in 4 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS, supranote 109, at 3074-81 (no power over education); James Buchanan, Veto Messages,
in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 3130-38 (no power to make local improvements),
& at 3139-45 (no power to give public lands away to settlers); Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in
2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 1046-56 (no power to finance local improvements);
Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 1139-54 (no
power to establish a national bank); James Madison, Veto Message, in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS,
supra note 109, at 569-70 (no power to establish roads and canals); James Monroe, Veto Message,
in 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 711-12 (no power to establish toll roads);
Franklin Pierce, Veto Messages, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 2780-89 (no
power to construct hospitals for the insane), at 2790-2804 (no power to make local
improvements); Franklin Pierce, Veto Messages, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at
2919-21 (no power to make internal improvements); James K. Polk, Veto Messages, in 3
MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 2310-16 (no power to construct local improvements);
James K. Polk, Veto Message, in 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at 2460-76 (same);
John Tyler, Veto Messages, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supranote 109, at 1916-21 (no power to
incorporate a bank); John Tyler, Veto Messages, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS, supra note 109, at
2183-86 (no power to improve navigation of rivers).
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rather than the modern method of explicitly declaring federal laws
unconstitutional.
IV. JUDIcIAL REVIEW AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVISITED
Louis Hartz reached an important conclusion for the wrong
reason when he famously declared that "law has flourished on the
corpse of philosophy in America. '"" Hartz believed that "judicial review as it has worked in America" could be explained only by "the
national acceptance of the Lockean creed,... since the removal of
high policy to the realm of adjudication implies a prior recognition of
the principles to be legally interpreted. " " This observation hardly
explains the best known fundamental rights decisions in Supreme
Court history. When resolving political controversies over slavery,
contractual relationships, and abortion, the justices could not be said
to have applied consensual norms, unless those norms are described at
such a high level of abstraction as to yield almost any result in practice.'
The Supreme Court survived such decisions as Dred Scott,
Lochner, and Roe because important members of the dominant national coalition supported the judicial decision at the time that the
decision was handed down, and not because the decision was based on
a Lockean creed endorsed by all."'
Hartz's analysis better fits the naked land transfer cases. With
respect to the results in Polk's Lessee, Percheman, Pollard's Lessee,
and related cases, the "national acceptance of the Lockean creed" did
imply "prior recognition of the principles to be legally interpreted. '' 2
Everyone agreed that government could not give to B land that belonged to A. No political interest was thwarted by the "removal of
[this] policy to the realm of adjudication!" 3 because the Supreme Court
was not resolving a controversy over whether government should
recognize some fundamental right. All the justices did was to apply
the consensual ban on government expropriation of private property to
the particular facts before the Court.

228. Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 10 (1955).
229. Id. at 9.
230. Even Nazi policy could be described as a manifestation of one (perverse) conception of
equality or human dignity.

231. See Mark A. Graber, The NonmajoritarianDifficulty, Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993); see also WILLIAM LASSER, THE LIMITS OF
JUDICIAL POWER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1988).
232. HARTZ, supra note 228, at 9.
233. Id.
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The consensual foundations of the naked land transfer cases
belie Bickel's aphorism that the Supreme Court is "a counter-majoritarian force in our system of government," that "when the Supreme
Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an
elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
people of the here and now." ' The Marshall and Taney Court, when
enforcing the prohibition against naked land transfers, did not rely on
a principle rejected by the dominant national coalition. For example,
when Justice Baldwin upheld the validity of a foreign land grant
against a contrary federal claim, he noted "a perfect coincidence of
opinion between all the departments of the government, on the subject
of Spanish titles.""' Similar comments could have been made on most
other land issues. Judicial review took place in such cases as Polk's
Lessee, Percheman, and Pollard's Lessee, even though a broad interbranch consensus existed on the constitutional prohibition against
naked land transfers.
The antebellum land cases illustrate various ways in which judicial review may be exercised even when legislative and judicial
majorities agree on fundamental constitutional principles and rules.
Sometimes, the justices grounded their decisions on consensual constitutional restraints on government power rather than on the relevant
statute that embodied those consensual constitutional restraints.
Little attention was given to savings clauses in federal land grants
that Congress thought statutorily prevented federal grantees from obtaining title to land previously granted to another person. This judicial practice proved uncontroversial. No reason existed for elected officials to protest when the justices ruled that Congress could not
exercise a power that Congress had not exercised, did not wish to exercise, and did not believe could be constitutionally exercised.
The decisions in many land cases are best characterized as correcting legislative mistakes that the legislature would have corrected
if given better information and time. Because ascertaining land titles
proved confusing in practice, elected officials had trouble identifying
when they violated the constitutional taboo against naked land transfers. Rather than resolve the matter legislatively or by appointing a
commission, elected officials consciously decided that the federal judiciary would be entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring that the
government had not given land to B that belonged to A. By including
a savings clause in virtually all land grants, Congress essentially

234. BICKEL, supra note 18,at 16-17, 128.
235. Lessee of Pollard's Heirs v. Kibbe, 39 U.S. 353, 390 (1840) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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charged the federal judiciary with the responsibility for ensuring that
the federal government had not made a naked land transfer. As Chief
Justice Marshall declared without contradiction in Soulard v. United
States, "the duty of deciding on these various titles" had been "transferred by the government to the judicial department. '' "s Federal land
grants were voided by courts because legislatures wanted the justices
to void land grants that by legislative accident had expropriated private property. This was hardly a counter-majoritarian practice.
Federal justices also seem to have been legislatively entrusted
with the authority to determine certain minor applications of the constitutional prohibition against naked land transfers. The text of the
relevant statute in Percheman strongly implied that Congress thought
all persons should submit their land claims to the federal commission.
Nevertheless, Congress seemed more concerned with preventing
naked land transfers than with the precise procedures that should be
used for ascertaining good title, at least no one expressed any qualms
when the justices provided an alternative means for establishing
titles.
Pollard'sLessee may illustrate a combination of these forms of
legislative/judicial cooperation. Given that the legislation under consideration was a private bill, most congresspersons may not have been
aware that they were conveying land below the high water mark of a
state river. During the 1840s, the few prominent politicians who took
a strong interest in tidewater policy concluded that the Constitution
vested states with title to land below the high water mark of state
rivers. 'There appears no doubt," the leading study of the issue concludes, "but that the Congress was aware of [Pollard'sLessee] and was
in accord with it. '' "? So understood, the Taney Court may have simply
corrected an acknowledged legislative oversight. Alternatively, Congress may not have thought that the precise issue in Pollard'sLessee
was worth deciding legislatively. Control of riverbeds in new states
was certainly not considered important enough to be seriously debated.
The federal executive proved no more interested than
Congress, never intervening in any case involving title to lands below
the high water mark. These cases, and other cases raising naked land
transfers, were apparently deemed to be private contests for land to be
legally resolved by the judiciary according to known judicial
standards.

236. Soulard v. United States, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 511, 513 (1829).
237. ERNEST R. BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 63 (1979) (noting the discussion
by Senators of the meaning of "equal footing" as used in the Pollard'sLessee case).
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Polk's Lessee, Percheman, Pollard's Lessee, and related cases
may have provided the consensual foundations that helped establish
judicial review of federal statutes and judicial protection of certain
fundamental rights not specifically enumerated in the constitutional
text. Judicial review of federal legislation was a broadly accepted
practice by the middle of the Jacksonian erae 8 partly as the result of a
series of decisions, such as Marbury, that imposed politically inconsequential constitutional limits on federal power."3 9 Sharp attacks were
made on judicial review every time the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law of some consequence. 0 Judicial decisions
striking down a federal law of similar consequence would no doubt
lead to a similar antagonistic response. Fortunately for the fate of
judicial review, the federal judiciary during the decades before Dred
Scott was not asked to resolve those constitutional conflicts that
divided the American polity. The Supreme Court's federal law docket
until the Civil War was dominated by politically uncontroversial land
cases, technical questions of federal jurisdiction, and other issues of
similar political insignificance. No need existed in this legal environment for Supreme Court justices and their supporters to explain why
238. Charles Warren notes that most political attacks on the federal judiciary were
abandoned after the early 1830s. See Charles Warren, Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the
Supreme Court of the United States: A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47
AM. L. REV. 161, 164, 176-85 (1913). Mainstream Jacksonians during the 1840s and 1850s
lavished effusive praised on the Supreme Court. Lewis Cass, the Democratic candidate for the
presidency in 1848 was one of many Jacksonians who became a judicial supremacist, proclaiming
that "it is a great moral spectacle to see the decrees of the Judges of our Supreme Court on the
most vital questions obeyed in such a country as this." CARL BRENT SWISHER, THE TANEY
PERIOD, 1836-64, at 151 (1974). Senator Thomas Ewing of Ohio similarly "look[ed] to the
Supreme Court as the palladium of our institutions and as one of the brightest and purest
ornaments of our system." Id. at 217. Caleb Cushing, Attorney General during the Pierce
Administration asserted that "our country looks with undoubting confidence" to the Court "as the
interpreters and the guardians of the organic laws of the Union." CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER
B. TANEY 501 (1935).
239. The naked land transfer cases also highlight Marbury's peculiar contribution to the
establishment of judicial review. Scholars have noted that Chief Justice Marshall was by no
means compelled to declare unconstitutional Section 13 of theJudiciary Act of 1789. One
reasonable alternative would have been to interpret that provision as not adding to the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v.
Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 14-16. Percheman and related cases indicate that this was normal
judicial practice in antebellum America. Marshall and Taney Court justices routinely construed,
even misconstrued, statutes in order to avoid declaring those statutes unconstitutional. That
Marshall rejected the statutory alternative in Marbury, and only Marbury, provides further
evidence that the Court in 1803 went out of its way to provide a judicial precedent for judicial
review, deliberately choosing a politically inconsequential measure to declare unconstitutional.
See Graber, supranote 28, at 34-38.
240. See, e.g., Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal Unions:
The Early United States (1790-1860) and the European Community (1958-94), 11 STUD. IN AM.
POL. DEV. 149 (1997).
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countermajoritarian judicial review was a desirable practice.'
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have adjudicated a question of federal constitutional law on which a
majority of Americans had an opinion. Moreover, judicial review could
easily be presented as a non-partisan practice. Again, with the exception of slavery, the justices before the Civil War rarely, if ever, adjudicated a question of federal constitutional power on which there were
well-established partisan positions to take.
These politically inconsequential land cases helped establish
judicial review of federal legislation by generating much good will for
the judiciary. Judicial willingness to correct legislative errors that
resulted in naked land transfers may have fostered a belief among a
citizenry committed to Lockean notions of private property that judicial review as practiced during the Jacksonian era was largely a force
for good. The only persons disturbed by judicial rulings were those
parties whose land claims were rejected. All prominent persons endorsed the central constitutional principles the justices relied on to
resolve disputes over title. All prominent officials believed that courts
were the institutions that should resolve conflicting land claims. That
judicial review was a popular practice during the 1840s and 1850s,2"
therefore, should hardly be surprising. No prominent oxen were gored
by these judicial decisions. Asking courts to tackle more difficult
issues, such as slavery in the territories, seemed a wise strategy given
the demonstrated judicial capacity to resolve land controversies to the
satisfaction of almost all citizens.
Indeed, the political events partly responsible for the Dred
Scott decision probably took place only because the naked land transfer and related cases had placed judicial review of federal legislation
in the United States on a secure footing. Past scholarship has demonstrated that prominent elected officials worked hard to foist responsibility on to the courts for determining the extent to which slavery
could be banned in federal territories."3 What this scholarship does
not explain is why southern Democrats, who during the 1850s strongly
championed legislative deference to the judiciary, thought the justices
might declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional. Conven-

241. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 381-413 (noting the lack of countermajoritarian
criticism of judicial review during the Jacksonian era).
242. See 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 67
(1926).
243. For detailed accounts of legislative efforts to have the judiciary resolve contested issues
over slavery, see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 152-208 (1978); Graber, supra note 231, at 46-50; Wallace
Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered,38 MINN. L. REV. 16, 22-23 (1953).
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tional constitutional histories imply that pro-slavery advocates for
some unknown reason expected the Supreme Court to hand down a
decision that would be unprecedented in numerous respects. Polk's
Lessee, Percheman,Pollard'sLessee, and related cases, by comparison,
suggest that a judicial decision limiting federal power to regulate
slavery in the territories would be relatively consistent, though hardly
compelled, by recent judicial practice.
If past scholarship is correct, pro-slavery advocates were the
most irrationally successful optimists in American history. Southern
calls for a judicial ruling on the constitutional status of slavery in the
territories, in this view, blithely assumed that a substantial chance
existed that the Supreme Court would declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional even though that tribunal had not declared a
federal law unconstitutional for approximately a half a century. Proslavery advocates were reasonably confident of a favorable judicial
outcome, even though they should have known that Taney Court justices shared a very narrow conception of the judicial role in constitutional cases. As noted above,2" much contemporary commentary suggests that antebellum justices until Dred Scott made every rational
presumption in favor of constitutional power, were only willing to
declare unconstitutional federal laws associated with federal jurisdiction or judicial procedure, and had never declared a federal law inconsistent with some fundamental right that was not specifically enumerated in the Constitution. Lacking inside information that the
justices would abandon these practices only in slavery cases,"5 southerners during the 1850s apparently had no more reason to think that
the Supreme Court would declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional on the basis of an unenumerated constitutional right to bring
slaves into the territories, than contemporary democratic socialists
have for thinking that the Rehnquist Court will declare federal welfare laws unconstitutional on the basis of an unenumerated constitutional right to livelihood.
Southern enthusiasm before Dred Scott for a judicial resolution
of slavery issues makes far more sense if, as the naked land transfer
and other cases discussed in this Article indicate, judicial review of
federal legislation was a relatively established practice before the

244. See supranotes 192-93.
245. James Buchanan was informed shortly before taking the oath of office that the Supreme
Court had voted to declare the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.
See Phillip G.
Auchampaugh, James Buchanan, the Court, and the Dred Scott Case, 10 TENN. HIST. MAG. 231
(1929). No evidence exists that pro-slavery advocates had inside information before 1857 on
whether the justices would strike down that measure.
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Civil War. These decisions gave pro-slavery advocates good reason for
thinking that justices would rule that the national government had no
power to ban slavery in the territories, or at the very least, that the
justices would not refrain from handing down such a decision as the
result of a judicial commitment to some strong theory of judicial restraint. The antebellum Supreme Court regularly established constitutional limits on federal power. Moreover, the justices did not in
practice afford federal legislation a nearly irrebutable presumption of
constitutionality, did not limit the power of judicial review to laws of a
judiciary nature, and were quite willing to require the national government to respect certain fundamental rights that were not specified
in the constitutional text. A judicial decision holding that Congress
could not ban slavery in the territories would be far more politically
consequential than any ruling the justices had ever handed down.
That decision would not, however, be that legally different from past
Supreme Court decisions.
The Dred Scott decision was not a gross deviation from past
practice, or an instance where the Taney Court under political pressure abandoned previously cherished notions of judicial restraint. The
justices in that case adopted neither a novel theory of judicial review
nor a novel theory of constitutional interpretation. The Supreme
Court had previously imposed constitutional limits on federal power
and had claimed that certain unenumerated fundamental rights were
the source of that constitutional limitation. The main difference between Dred Scott and the naked land transfer cases is that the justices
in the former case imposed a constitutional limit on federal power by
explicitly declaring a federal law unconstitutional instead of merely
ignoring or misconstruing the statute under constitutional attack.
Scholars who criticize the result in Dred Scott or, for that matter, the results in such decisions as Lochner and Roe must nevertheless acknowledge that fundamental rights jurisprudence has played a
role in constitutional adjudication from the beginning of the republic.
The antebellum Supreme Court protected a right against government
expropriation of land that was not explicitly mentioned in the federal
constitution. Even when constitutional or statutory text could be used
to support a particular decision, judicial opinions preferred the language of fundamental principle to positive law. This legal pedigree
suggests that the principle that governing officials could not give to B
land that belonged to A bears a distinct resemblance to the privilege to
bring slaves into American territories protected by Dred Scott, the
liberty of contract protected by Lochner, and the right to an abortion
protected by Roe.
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That Polk's Lessee, Percheman, and Pollard's Lessee provide
historical support for claims that the Constitution protects certain
fundamental rights not plainly specified in the constitutional text does
not justify on historical grounds the theory of judicial review implicit
in Dred Scott, Lochner, Roe, and other fundamental rights cases. The
justices in Polk's Lessee and related cases were protecting a consensual right from legislative mistake or, with legislative permission,
establishing minor rules respecting that right. With the possible exception of Fletcher, the justices in naked land transfer cases never
made contested constitutional assertions concerning the rights protected by the Constitution. In the slavery, liberty of contract, and
abortion cases, the justices attempted to resolve social conflicts over
whether the Constitution protects what some citizens believed to be a
fundamental right. The Supreme Court in these fundamental rights
cases took sides in a political controversy, and did not merely apply
consensual principles of right to a unique set of contested facts. Polk's
Lessee would have resembled Lochner had the Tennessee legislature
intervened in the lawsuit and asserted the constitutional authority to
expropriate property. Lochner would have resembled Polk's Lessee
had the real issue before the Court been only whether Joseph
Lochner's employees were contractually obligated -to work more than
sixty hours a week, with all parties agreeing that the legislature had
no authority to forbid contracts requiring an employee to work that
hard. Following Percheman, the Lochner Court might have interpreted the New York statute as merely providing that agreements to
work more than sixty hours a week must be stated explicitly in the
contract, on the ground that the statute would have been unconstitutional if interpreted as banning such contractual arrangements.
V. CONCLUSION

Whether Dred Scott, Lochner, or Roe was correctly decided is
beyond the scope of this study. The naked land transfer cases establish that the judiciary has historically protected fundamental rights
not plainly specified in the constitutional text. The central issue in
contemporary fundamental rights cases, however, is whether the judicial practice of protecting consensual fundamental rights from legislative oversight justifies the judicial practice of resolving controversies
over what rights are sufficiently fundamental to enjoy constitutional
protection. The naked land transfer cases do not provide historical
support for any position in this debate because the justices were never
asked to resolve those constitutional controversies over land that
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divided the antebellum polity. 6 The above analysis of judicial review
before the Civil War, however, may inform contemporary fundamental
rights jurisprudence. Polk's Lessee, Percheman, and Pollard'sLessee
demonstrate that judicial review is not necessarily countermajoritarian. Elected officials have approved, disapproved, and been indifferent to judicial decisions limiting government power. Determining
whether Dred Scott, Lochner, Roe, or any other fundamental rights
decision "thwarted the will of the prevailing majority," therefore,
requires detailed investigation into the actual interactions between
federal justices and elected officials, not ritual chanting of Bickel's
aphorism.

246. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.

